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ABSTRACT—This Article presents a theory of judicial notice for the 
information age. It argues that the ease of accessing factual data on the 
Internet allows judges and litigants to expand the use of judicial notice in 
ways that raise significant concerns about admissibility, reliability, and fair 
process. State and federal courts are already applying the surprisingly pliant 
judicial notice rules to bring websites ranging from Google Maps to 
Wikipedia into the courtroom, and these decisions will only increase in 
frequency in coming years. This rapidly emerging judicial phenomenon is 
notable for its ad hoc and conclusory nature—attributes that have the 
potential to undermine the integrity of the factfinding process. The theory 
proposed here, which is the first attempt to conceptualize judicial notice in 
the information age, remedies these potential failings by setting forth both 
an analytical framework for decision, as well as a process for how courts 
should memorialize rulings on the propriety of taking judicial notice of 
Internet sources to allow meaningful review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a federal drug prosecution, a man is arrested on a corner across the 
street from an elementary school. The suspect is caught with 100 grams of 
cocaine.1 Federal law provides a sentencing enhancement for drug 
possession in a “drug-free zone,” which is defined as the area within 1000 
feet of a school.2 The prosecutor asks the court to take judicial notice of the 
fact that the corner is within 1000 feet of the school.3 The judge does a 
quick Google search and finds that in fact the corner is exactly 50 feet from 
the school.4 The defense objects, but concedes that Google mapping 
 
1 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2012) (criminalizing possession of cocaine). 
2 See id. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 860(a) (providing a statutory enhancement for distributing 
narcotics in a designated drug-free zone).  
3 See FED. R. EVID. 201. 
4 A “Google search” involves utilizing the web search engine created by Google. See How Search 
Works, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory (last visited May 11, 
2014). Several other web search engines, such as Yahoo! and Bing, offer similar information-gathering 
functions.  
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technology is an accurate measure of distances.5 Can the judge take judicial 
notice of this accurate, readily provable fact? 
Computers are now a common sight in courtrooms.6 Judges sit behind 
screens. Litigants bring laptops and tablets to counsel table. Clerks and 
paralegals have access to smartphones, computers, and everything those 
devices can retrieve on the Internet. As a result, answers to factual 
questions that arise in court are now just one search away: Did the accident 
occur on a one-way street? Was the bank closed at the time of the robbery? 
Had the area flooded in the last year? Participants in the fact-finding 
process can now access a reliable, factually accurate answer by “Googling” 
it or using equivalent electronic search technology.7 A judge could pull up 
an image of the official road signs on the street in question. A prosecutor 
could show on the bank’s website that the bank is closed on Saturday 
afternoons. The insurance defendant could show past flood records from an 
official government page. Because of the vast amount of information on the 
Internet, facts are, more than ever before, capable of being “accurately and 
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned”8—the test for judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 
201 (and under the majority of state evidence codes).9 
This Article presents a theory of judicial notice for the information 
age. It argues that the ease of accessing factual data now available on the 
Internet will allow judges and litigants to expand the use of judicial notice 
in ways that raise significant concerns about admissibility, reliability, and 
fair process.10 Factual reliability on the Internet is not uniform. Certain 
 
5 See, e.g., Kemp v. Zavaras, No. 09-cv-00295-WYD-MJW, 2010 WL 1268094, at *2 n.3 (D. Colo. 
Mar. 29, 2010) (“A court may take judicial notice of the driving distance between two points located in 
the record using mapping services, such as Google Maps (http://maps.google.com/), whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”). 
6 Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Technology in litigation has changed enormously since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
in 1975. . . . As one commentator put it, ‘[d]esktop portable computers now bedeck courtrooms like 
dandelions in May and, like dandelions, their number, use and application continue to grow.’” (quoting 
Edward A. Hannan, Computer-Generated Evidence: Testing the Envelope, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 353, 362 
(1996))). 
7 This Article uses the term “Google search” as a generic term for a search on any Internet search 
engine. At the time of writing, Google is the number one search engine in the world. To “Google” a 
subject for inquiry has become recognized as a verb in the English language. See Google, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/google?s=t (last visited May 12, 2014) 
(“[T]o use a search engine such as Google to find information, a website address, etc., on the 
Internet.”). 
8 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
9 See infra Part I; see also FED. R. EVID. 201; 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5101.2 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing variations in 
state rules); Ellie Margolis, It’s Time to Embrace the New—Untangling the Uses of Electronic Sources 
in Legal Writing, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 191, 200 (2013) (“All states have a similar rule” to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 201). 
10 See infra Part III. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1140 
information sources from government websites, mapping services, or 
official reporting agencies may be sufficiently accurate, and thus 
“admissible” under the judicial notice doctrine.11 Certain other sources, 
built by anonymous contributors, or aggregating information, may be much 
less accurate.12 Drawing lines about which sources are accurate “enough” 
will in the first instance be left to judges, ill-equipped to make decisions 
under the time pressures of trial.13 Further, appellate courts will be unable 
to examine these choices without an established process to evaluate and 
record those evidentiary decisions.14 The theory proposed here addresses 
these uncertainties by setting forth both an analytical framework as well as 
a process for how courts should record and memorialize their decisions. 
This Article develops a decisional framework for judges, litigants, and 
scholars to evaluate the appropriateness of judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts obtained from the Internet. It is a framework informed by the 
principles already established in the Federal Rules of Evidence, including, 
of course, the rule that specifically governs judicial notice, Rule 201. 
Concerns about reliability, authenticity, “best evidence,” and the proper 
judicial role in an adversary system run throughout the Federal Rules, 
establishing preferences for certain forms of evidence over others and 
procedures for evaluating admissibility.15 Efficiency is clearly prized in the 
Federal Rules, reflecting Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous “concession to 
the shortness of life,” but not to the exclusion of other concerns, such as a 
distrust of hearsay, a preference for adversarial—not inquisitorial—
presentation, and the importance of due process.16 These conflicting but 
fundamental principles ground the core of our approach to solving 
questions of judicial notice in the age of the Internet. 
In assessing whether, in the language of Rule 201, a source proffered 
as worthy of judicial notice is one whose “accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned,” courts should look to three factors: (1) the source’s knowledge 
of the subject matter, (2) the source’s independence from relevant bias, and 
(3) the source’s motivation to ensure accuracy of the posted information.17 
As applied, these framing principles avoid creating a static definition of 
acceptable sources. In an ever-evolving technological medium, identifying 
 
11 See infra Part II.A. 
12 See infra Part II.B. 
13 This is not to say that judges cannot make such decisions. Most evidentiary matters are resolved 
quickly in trial without significant briefing or specific findings of fact. However, the use of Internet 
sources to take judicial notice of facts offers some cautionary lessons for trial courts. This Article seeks 
to help judges make those decisions quickly and consistently by providing a new framework for 
analysis. 
14 See infra Part III.E.  
15 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102, 401–03, 901–02, 1001–08. 
16 Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (Mass. 1887); see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801–07, 1002, 
404(b)(2). 
17 See infra Parts III & IV.  
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particular websites or information sources worthy of judicial notice is less 
valuable than developing a theory of how to evaluate particular sources. 
This approach can adapt as the number of available information sources 
expands in the coming decades. 
This new framework is needed because judges and litigants are already 
relying on search engines to find facts, investigate witnesses, and prepare 
their cases before trial, even in the absence of a cohesive theory.18 Ignoring 
the ability to determine answerable facts within the construct of a formal 
trial process will not stop participants from learning the answers. As has 
been discussed by other scholars, jurors have taken to researching through 
the Internet, and judges have been known to resolve questions through 
independent Internet research.19 Failing to answer an answerable question 
does not mean that it will remain unanswered, but only that the court loses 
the ability to control the inquiry. This result is neither comforting, nor 
necessary, because a new framework can be designed to organize and 
categorize the potential information sources. 
The proposed theory seeks to modernize the federal rule on judicial 
notice, not reject it. The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to adapt 
to changing trial realities, and they offer useful insights into how a 
particular trial judge should evaluate a particular fact.20 Examining the 
judicial notice rule through this lens offers a way to map the existing 
language onto the new world of instant information. It also raises a host of 
questions that courts will be forced to answer in the near future.21 
 
18 See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 141–42 (2013) (“The Internet is not going 
away. The quality and quantity of online material that illuminates the issues in federal litigation will 
only grow. Judges must not ignore such a rich mine of information.”). See generally Thaddeus 
Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 
611–12 (2012) (discussing how litigants use the Internet and social media to investigate jurors during 
voir dire); Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social 
Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 20–24 (2012) (surveying jurors on their use of social media during 
trials); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1688–94 (2008) (describing the global availability of personal information 
on the Internet); Ebony Nicolas, Note, A Practical Framework for Preventing “Mistrial by Twitter,” 
28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2010) (discussing the impact of Twitter on juries and jury 
trials); Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Survive Google?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 4, 8 
(discussing the problem of jurors conducting their own factual research through Internet sources). 
19 See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital 
Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 449 (2012); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 
1582 (2011); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent 
Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 159 (2008); Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-
First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 301, 303–04 (2010). 
20 See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to . . . promote the development 
of evidence law . . . .”). 
21 See infra Part III.  
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Part I of this Article surveys the history and purpose of the judicial 
notice doctrine.22 This early history demonstrates a rather flexible approach 
to judicial notice, which was quite deferential to judges’ determinations of 
facts. The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 201 signaled a more 
restrictive approach limited to the finding of adjudicative facts.23 Though 
the theory of judicial notice, both before and after the passage of Rule 201, 
was essentially a safety-valve doctrine allowing judges to fill in the gaps of 
certain evidence, in practice judicial notice was regularly taken in subjects 
that greatly expanded the scope of the doctrine. 
Part II explores the intersection of new Internet information sources 
and the venerable judicial notice doctrine. In addition to canvassing the 
current state of judicial use of new information sources, this Part looks at 
the practical and evidentiary hurdles to admitting Internet information 
sources. 
Part III sets out the new theory for judicial notice in the information 
age. Again, this framework suggests analyzing a source’s knowledge, 
independence, and motivation before relying on it to take judicial notice of 
a fact. This framework acknowledges the important limiting principles in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence’s restrictions on the judicial role and distrust 
of hearsay. Judicial notice, even when based on accurate and reliable 
sources, should not change the balance of the adversarial system or the 
protections built within the hearsay doctrine. The proposed approach 
instead seeks to work within existing guideposts established by the Federal 
Rules that have not yet adapted to modern technology. The purpose here is 
to set out an analytical structure that will guide courts and litigants when 
the issue of judicial notice arises. Depending on the fact and the source 
consulted, judicial noticeability may well change. However, the established 
structure should allow judges to defend their admittedly discretionary 
choices. Equally important, the analysis includes a procedural component, 
so that appellate courts can adequately review the arguments and sources 
that underlie judicial notice determinations.  
Part IV concludes by applying the theory to four real world examples. 
Judges, lawyers, and scholars need a framework to decide difficult 
questions of judicial notice, and this proposal is the first to address this 
contested and evolving subject. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Judicial notice has an ancient pedigree. Although it was first 
referenced in treatises in 1824,24 the process of judges taking notice of 
 
22 See infra Part I.  
23 See FED. R. EVID. 201 (discussing adjudicative facts). 
24 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 279 
& n.1 (1898) (“We are the less surprised, therefore, to find that it was not until Starkie printed his book 
on evidence, in 1824, that any special mention of this subject occurs in legal treatises on evidence; and 
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undisputed facts is likely as old as judging itself.25 This Part briefly sets out 
the pre-Federal Rules history of judicial notice. As originally conceived, 
judicial notice existed as a broad grant of authority to trial judges.26 The 
diversity and flexibility granted to trial courts, and the vast array of 
judicially noticed subjects in early cases, provides some insight into the 
potential of judicial notice in the information age.27 Further, this 
background informs the adoption of Federal Rule 201 and its approach to 
judicial notice in federal and (as filtered through state evidence codes) state 
courts.28 The challenge of judicial notice has always been how to balance 
efficiency and accuracy within the adversarial justice model. 
A. The Early Theory of Judicial Notice: Efficiency and Accuracy 
The concept of judicial notice emerged from a judge-centered, 
common-law tradition in order to make fact-finding more efficient and 
accurate.29 As John Henry Wigmore summarized: 
 
that [Starkie] has very little to say about it. . . . He concludes, inter alia, that a judge should be allowed 
‘at the instance of either party to pronounce, and, in the formation of the ground of the decision, 
assume, any alleged matter of fact as notorious,’ subject to the right of the other party to deny the 
notoriety and call for proof.”); John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the 
Morgan–Wigmore Controversy, in ESSAYS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 56, 59 (Thomas G. Roady 
Jr. & Robert N. Covington eds., 1961) (“The expression ‘judicial notice’ is of obscure origin. Bentham 
discusses the subject in his works written between 1802 and 1812 but does not use the phrase ‘judicial 
notice.’ A variation of it appears, perhaps for the first time, in the sideheads of a treatise by Starkie in 
1824.” (citing Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
208, 276–78 (John Bowring ed., 1843))). 
25  THAYER, supra note 24, at 277 (“The maxim that what is known need not be proved, manifesta 
[or notoria] non indigent probatione, may be traced far back in the civil and the canon law; indeed, it is 
probably coeval with legal procedure itself.”); McNaughton, supra note 24, at 59–60 (footnote omitted) 
(“Bracton reported the maxim over seven centuries ago ea que manifesta sunt, non indigent probacione 
(‘that which is obvious need not be proved’). Application of the principle to a fact was reported in the 
Year Books over six centuries ago.”). 
26 THAYER, supra note 24, at 279 (“[Judicial notice is] woven into the very texture of the judicial 
function.”); Arthur John Keeffe et al., Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664, 
664 (1950) (“We know that not every fact is proved during the course of a law suit—manifesta 
probatione non indigent (what is known need not be proved). This practice has its roots far back in the 
civil and canon law.”). 
27 See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 325 n.29 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(taking judicial notice of Sprint’s plan to sell the iPhone by relying on news reports on 
www.engadget.com and news.cnet.com). See generally Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-
Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 27, 55 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (“The federal 
courts and state courts seem to have an easier time extending judicial notice to online information 
produced by government entities than information found on private websites. Historically this is 
consistent with how courts usually treat information. Authority from government sources has generally 
been accorded judicial notice over authority from the private sector.”). 
28 See infra Part I.C (discussing the creation of Federal Rule of Evidence 201). 
29 Examples of courts taking notice of generally accepted facts can be found as far back as the 
fourteenth century. See THAYER, supra note 24, at 282 (“In 1302, in an assize of novel disseisin against 
John de Wilton and others, a plea in abatement for misnomer was put forward: . . . [‘]Sir John answers 
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The object of this rule is to save time, labor, and expense in securing and 
introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute 
and are actually not bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be 
assumed from the tribunal’s general knowledge or from slight research on its 
part. . . . It thus becomes a useful expedient for speeding trials and curing 
informalities.30 
Initially arising as a means to soften strict pleading rules, in which the 
omission of a fact could result in the dismissal of a complaint,31 judicial 
notice became a useful shortcut in the ordinary course of trial.32 
Central to the legitimacy of the shortcut, however, was the correctness 
of the judicially noticed fact.33 Judicially noticed facts were either 
“notorious”34 (meaning obvious) or verifiable.35 As Wigmore wrote, 
 
and says that his name is John de Willington; judgment of the writ . . . . He is known through all 
England as Willington, and by no other name, and that well know we; and therefore as to John you shall 
take nothing by your writ.’ This, as we have it, is giving judgment upon a point of ordinary fact as being 
notorious.”). 
30 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A POCKET CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW 
§ 2120 (1910). 
31 Lewis W. Beilin, Comment, In Defense of Wisconsin’s Judicial Notice Rule, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
499, 503 (“James Bradley Thayer located the origins of judicial notice in summary judgment procedure 
under the early, strict pleading rules. According to Thayer, early American courts occasionally noticed 
obvious facts omitted from a pleading in order to avoid having to dismiss the claim outright.” (citing 
THAYER, supra note 24, at 279)). 
32 Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 951 (1955) (“[J]udicial notice ‘is 
an instrument of great capacity in the hands of a competent judge; and it is not nearly as much used . . . 
as it should be. . . . [T]he failure to exercise it tends daily to smother trials with technicality and 
monstrously lengthens them out.’” (quoting THAYER, supra note 24, at 309)).  
33 Warren F. Schwartz, A Suggestion for the Demise of Judicial Notice of “Judicial Facts,” 
45 TEX. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1967) (Judicial notice is understood to be facts that are “so indisputably 
settled that although normally in the province of the fact finder (usually a jury) it can be resolved by the 
judge without hearing evidence. . . . The test for permitting judicial notice is whether the facts ‘are so 
generally known or of such common notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction . . . that they cannot 
reasonably be the subject of dispute. . . . [or] are capable of immediate and accurate determination by 
resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.’” (quoting UNIF. R. EVID. 9(2))). 
34 1 WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2130 (internal brackets omitted) (“The classes of matters which 
are authorized to be judicially noticed are as follows: A. Matters which are necessary for exercising the 
judicial functions and are therefore likely to be already known to the judge by virtue of his office; B. 
Matters which are actually so notorious in the community that evidence would be unnecessary; C. 
Matters which are not either necessary for the judge to know nor actually notorious, but are capable of 
such positive and exact proof, if demanded, that no party would be likely to impose upon the tribunal a 
false statement in the presence of an intelligent adversary.”); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2571 (2d ed. 1923) (“The 
scope of facts that may be noticed includes: (1) Matters which are so notorious to all that the production 
of evidence would be unnecessary; (2) Matters which the judicial function supposes the judge to be 
acquainted with, either actually or in theory; (3) Sundry matters not exactly included under either of 
these heads; . . . neither actually notorious nor bound to be judicially known, yet they would be capable 
of such instant and unquestionable demonstration, if desired, that no party would think of imposing a 
falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent adversary.”). 
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A fact may be judicially noticed which, in view of the state of commerce, 
industry, history, language, science, or other human activity, is so notorious in 
the community that the introduction of evidence would be unnecessary. . . . 
Illustrations. That July 4 is the anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence; that extreme cold is apt to be experienced in railway 
transportation in January but not in June; that the distance between Chicago 
and New York is nearly 1000 miles . . . .36 
The sources of these judicially noticed facts came from traditional 
forms of collected knowledge including almanacs, government documents, 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, maps, and judicial records.37 Judges did not 
need to know the information personally, as long as they could reasonably 
rely on these traditional sources.38 Judges expressly were not to rely on 
private experience or personal observation, but only on shared common 
knowledge.39 The result was a patchwork of judicial notice rulings that 
covered the scope of human existence (and litigation needs).40 
 
35 McNaughton, supra note 24, at 65 (“It should be clear that the desirability of confining decision 
to evidence offered by the parties must give way when the fact is patently indisputable. This is because 
adherence to the general adversary principle risks an obviously erroneous finding arguably leading to 
injustice in the particular case and certainly making the court appear ridiculous.”).  
36 1 WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2135.  
37 Id. § 2125 (“The judge may look at the statute-book, an almanac, a map, a dictionary, or the 
records of the court; and it is immaterial whether he finds the documents himself or looks at one 
supplied by a party publicly in court . . . .”); Thornburg, supra note 19, at 159 (“Until recently, judges 
and litigants typically used this provision to consult dictionaries, government documents, maps, 
encyclopedias, and well-recognized treatises.”). 
38 See Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 (1875) (“Courts will take notice of whatever is generally 
known within the limits of their jurisdiction; and, if the judge’s memory is at fault, he may refresh it by 
resorting to any means for that purpose which he may deem safe and proper.”); 1 WIGMORE, supra note 
30, § 2125 (“The judge may investigate or refresh his memory with any sources of information, for the 
purpose of ruling whether a fact is suitable and safe to be noticed; and, as a means therefor, may consult 
materials furnished by the parties themselves.”); James B. Thayer, Judicial Notice and the Law of 
Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 285, 309 (1890) (“It is to be observed that much is judicially noticed 
without proof, of which the court at a given moment may in fact know nothing. A statute may have 
been passed within a few hours or days, and be unknown to the court at the trial . . . . In such cases not 
only may a court, as indeed it must, avail itself of every source of information which it finds helpful, 
but also, for the proper expedition of business, it may require help from the parties in thus instructing 
itself.”); Recent Case, Auten v. Board of Directors of Special School Dist. of Little Rock, 104 S.W. 130 
(Ark.), 17 YALE L.J. 208, 208 (1908) (“Courts are not limited in their researches to legal literature, but 
may consult works on collateral sciences or arts, touching the topic on trial. . . .[B]ut judicial notice will 
not be taken of facts stated in [encyclopedias], dictionaries, or other publications unless they are of such 
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the 
common knowledge of every person.”). 
39 1 WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2126 (“In determining that a fact should be judicially noticed the 
judge is not to consider any information acquired from sources personal and private to his own 
experience and not common to the parties and the public at large . . . .”); accord 5 WIGMORE, supra 
note 34, § 2569 (“Where to draw the line between knowledge by notoriety and knowledge by personal 
observation may sometimes be difficult, but the principle is plain.”). 
40 THAYER, supra note 24, at 301 (footnote omitted) (“Among such things are the ordinary usages 
and practice of their courts; the general principles and rules of the law of their jurisdiction; the ordinary 
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B. The Early Common Law Practice of Judicial Notice 
Early commentators trying to synthesize the ad hoc decisions of 
common law courts reported a wide range of judicially noticed facts. In 
1890, James Thayer cataloged an eclectic set of facts that were 
appropriately judicially noticed including, “that a freight car left in a 
highway is not likely to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness,”41 “what are 
the ‘nature, operation, and ordinary uses’ of the telephone,”42 “what is the 
meaning, upon a parcel, of C.O.D.,”43 “that steamboats (first used in 1807) 
were in 1824 freely employed in transporting merchandise, and not merely 
passengers,”44 and “that ‘habitual drunkenness’ as a ground for divorce, and 
being a ‘habitual drunkard’ as a ground for punishment, do not include 
habitual or common excess in the use of morphine or chloroform.”45 
In his influential 1955 article on judicial notice, Kenneth Culp Davis 
listed a similarly diverse series of facts judicially noticed by the Supreme 
Court, including, “air carriage has brought Hawaii closer to the 
continent,”46 “newly developed electronic devices have greatly enhanced 
the effective use of air power,”47 “that silica dust is harmful to lungs,”48 
“that many employees in New York are not citizens,”49 and that “New York 
City produces more garments for interstate shipment than any other city in 
the Nation.”50 
Although case law provided few clear guidelines, several categories of 
fact were regularly judicially noticed, including geographic facts, scientific 
facts, historical facts, local facts, facts necessary to fulfill the judicial 
function (including interpreting words, court records, and law), and a 
broader (and more contestable) category of facts that were “commonly 
 
meaning, construction, and use of the vernacular language; the ordinary rules and methods of human 
thinking and reasoning; the ordinary data of human experience, and judicial experience in the particular 
region; the ordinary habits of men.”); McNaughton, supra note 24, at 64 (“What matters are noticed?—
The determination as to what information need not be adduced as formal evidence (i.e., what may be 
judicially noticed) reflects a judgment of appropriateness made by the courts on the basis of experience 
over the years. The determination depends sometimes on the nature of the information itself and 
sometimes on the nature of the proposition that the information is offered to prove. The situation is 
confused and exception-riddled.”). 
41 Thayer, supra note 38, at 307 (citing Gilbert v. Flint & P.M. Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 868, 869 (Mich. 
1883)). 
42 Id. (citing Wolfe v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 11 S.W. 49, 51 (Mo. 1889)). 
43 Id. (citing State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 73 Me. 278, 279 (1882)). 
44 Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 220 (1824)). 
45 Id. at 308 (citing Youngs v. Youngs, 22 N.E. 806, 808 (Ill. 1889); Commonwealth v. Whitney, 
65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 477, 481 (1853)). 
46 Davis, supra note 32, at 975 (quoting Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 375 
(1949)). 
47 Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). 
48 Id. at 975–76 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)). 
49 Id. at 976 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 276 (1947)). 
50 Id. (quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 120 (1946)). 
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known.”51 A brief analysis of these categories illustrates the themes of the 
early case law. 
1. Geographic Facts.—Common law courts were willing to notice 
geographic facts involving the location of natural phenomena like rivers, 
mountain ranges, and geographic areas.52 Jurisdictional facts identifying 
counties, cities, towns, and other local divisions were also noticed, but not 
necessarily by their precise boundaries.53 Courts declined to notice that a 
particular place was in a particular territory, even if the territory itself could 
be judicially noticed.54 Perhaps because mapping technologies were 
imprecise, courts erred on the side of making generalized findings, rather 
than specific geographical determinations. For example, a judge might 
judicially notice the fact that a river existed in a particular jurisdiction, but 
refuse to judicially notice the exact coordinates of the river, because the 
former was generally known, and the latter was not.55 
2. Scientific Facts.—Common law courts judicially noticed scientific 
facts that encompassed both the working of nature56 (e.g., “[t]he law of 
 
51 See infra Part I.B.1–6 (discussing the categories and subjects that were traditionally judicially 
noticed in the common law). 
52 Harry Lee Hudspeth, Note, Fairall v. Sutphen, 296 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.—Forth Worth 
1956), 35 TEX. L. REV. 731, 732 (1957); see also Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Fry, 177 S.W.2d 992, 
994 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), rev’d on other grounds, 180 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. 1944) (taking judicial notice 
that “Rockwall lies some 26 miles to the east and north of Dallas”); El Paso Elec. Ry. Co. v. Terrazas, 
208 S.W. 387, 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (taking judicial notice of the street where a particular railway 
runs); JOHN JAY MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 25 (1st. ed. 1897) (“The divisions 
of a state into counties and towns are judicially noticed.”). 
53 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8–9 & n.1 (10th ed. 1860) 
(“Courts also take notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction and sovereignty, exercised de facto 
by their own government; and of the local divisions of their country, as into states, provinces, counties, 
cities, towns, local parishes, or the like, so far as political government is concerned or affected; and of 
the relative positions of such local divisions; but not of their precise boundaries, farther than they may 
be described in public statutes. . . . But Courts do not take notice that particular places are or not in 
particular counties.”). 
54 THAYER, supra note 24, at 300 (“It is said sometimes that courts will notice the different 
counties, but not that any particular place is in a given county, or just where it is.” (citing Deybel’s 
Case, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.) 928; Brune v. Thompson, (1842) 114 Eng. Rep. 306 (Q.B.) 
307)). 
55 Thayer, supra note 38, at 305 (“A knowledge of certain great geographical facts will be assumed, 
as that Missouri is east of the Rocky Mountains, and that ‘such streams as the Mississippi, the Ohio, and 
the Wabash for some distance above its confluence with the Ohio, are navigable,’ but the point where 
they cease to be navigable is on a different footing.” (quoting Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257, 267 
(1867)) (citing Price v. Page, 24 Mo. 65, 67 (1856))). 
56 DAVID NASMITH, THE INSTITUTES OF ENGLISH ADJECTIVE LAW 87 (1879) (recognizing judicial 
notice for information such as “[t]he invariable course of nature. E.g., the revolutions of the solar 
system, the seasons, the divisions of time according to the calendar, the ordinary period of gestation in 
the human race.”); see also MCKELVEY, supra note 52, at 30 (“Certain facts in nature and the physical 
sciences are so well established, and have become so much a part of our habits of thought and the 
ordering of our lives, that no one disputes them. To require proof of them would be absurd. The judges 
assume these facts, just as all men do, and act and think in accordance with them.”). 
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gravitation, certain qualities and properties of matter, the nature and effects 
of heat, cold, light, etc.”),57 as well as accepted scientific conventions such 
as fixed weights and measures.58 On occasion, courts noticed types of 
medicines,59 mortality tables,60 and other scientifically based conclusions.61 
Of course, these judicially noticed facts were only as good as the existing 
science, and may in fact have been incorrect as a matter of scientific 
understanding today.62 At the same time, courts refused to notice facts that 
were not widely accepted (even if scientifically accurate).63 Thus, although 
established medical and scientific facts were subject to judicial notice, both 
what was “established” and what was “scientific” were not always clear. 
3. Historical Facts.—Common law courts judicially noticed 
historical facts that were commonly understood to be known by most 
people.64 As Thayer explained, “Certain great facts in literature and in 
history will be noticed without proof; e.g., what in a general way the Bible 
is, or Aesop’s Fables, or who Columbus was; but as to particular details of 
the contents of these books or of these books or of Columbus’s discoveries, 
it may well be otherwise.”65 Courts routinely relied upon more localized 
 
57 MCKELVEY, supra note 52, at 30; see also 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES, § 335 (3d ed. 1888) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he courts will take notice of 
the demonstrable conclusions of science. Thus a court will take notice of the movements of the 
heavenly bodies; of the graduations of time by longitude; . . . of the coincidence of days of the month 
with days of the week, of the order of the months . . . .”).  
58 NASMITH, supra note 56, at 87 (allowing judicial notice for “[t]he standards of weight and 
measure, and the divisions of the currency”). 
59 State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 90 N.E. 966, 967 (N.Y. 1910) (taking judicial notice that 
iodine, camphor, and arnica are medicines). 
60 Foerster v. Direito, 170 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (taking judicial notice of mortality 
tables). 
61 Recent Case, supra note 38, at 208 (recognizing “that the court will take judicial notice, as a 
matter of common knowledge, that a great majority of medical writers and practitioners advocate 
vaccination as an efficient means of preventing smallpox”); In re Holthausen’s Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 
142 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (taking judicial notice that human pregnancy is nine months). 
62 See e.g., Gilbert v. Klar, 228 N.Y.S. 183, 184 (App. Div. 1928) (taking “judicial notice that the 
X-ray is in common use and that the science and art thereof have been developed to a point where, in 
the hands of specialists, there is little or no danger”); Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the 
Law’s “Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON L. REV. 465, 467 (2007). 
63 See Charles T. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REV. 296, 301–03 (1952) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[J]udicial notice of scientific facts can be taken only when such facts are 
generally recognized . . . .”); Thornburg, supra note 19, at 158–59. 
64 MCKELVEY, supra note 52, at 36 (“Many historical facts of general, and even sometimes of 
local[] character, are judicially noticed.”); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES, § 338 (2d ed. 1879) (footnote omitted) (“A court will also take judicial 
notice of the leading public events of its own country; and will permit works of history (though not by 
living authors) to be cited to this effect.”). 
65 Thayer, supra note 38, at 305. 
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historical facts found in almanacs66 and calendars67 to determine dates, 
temperatures, and other historic data on sunrises, sunsets, and 
precipitation.68 Sometimes historical knowledge generally known in one era 
might be lost in another era. For example, in 1897, a Texas court stated, 
“[i]t is an historical fact, of which courts must take judicial knowledge, 
that, in the war between Texas and Mexico, Sam Houston held a high 
military office, and was actively engaged as a leader in the Texas army.”69 
Such knowledge may be historically accurate, but is no longer commonly 
known. 
4. Local Facts.—Occasionally local facts, unknown outside of the 
local court system, would still be judicially noticed because of a shared 
common understanding.70 For example, in 1919 a California court took 
judicial notice that Mission Street was in San Francisco’s business 
district.71 However, as Edmund Morgan noted in analyzing the same case, 
such an understanding could not be assumed anywhere except that local 
 
66 THAYER, supra note 24, at 307 (“The doctrine that almanacs may be referred to in order to 
ascertain upon what day of the week a given day of a month fell in any year, to learn the time of sunrise 
or sunset, and the like; and that, in order to prove facts of general history, approved books of history 
may be consulted, may also be regarded as illustrating the taking notice of the authenticity of evidential 
matters[]—of certain media of proof.”). 
67 Id. at 291–92 (“A well-known set of cases has to do with the calendar and certain sorts of facts 
ordinarily given in almanacs. When the books talk about ‘the calendar,’ they refer sometimes to the 
mere order and arrangement of days, and especially saints’ days and ecclesiastical feasts, by which the 
terms and days of court were regulated; and sometimes to the books or written or printed tables in 
which this order was set down. The courts of necessity recognized without proof the established order 
and arrangement of days; the phrase was that ‘the calendar was part of the law of England;’ and so it 
was said of ‘the almanac.’ In the multitude and multiplication of saints and saints’ days, and the 
intricacies attending upon the notion of movable feasts, and the arrangement of the Council of Nice 
fixing Easter by the relation of the moon to a certain date in March, it was no easy matter to find out the 
details of the calendar for any given year; so that the courts were assisted by written and printed tables 
of more or less authority.” (citing Queen v. Dyer, (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 803 (B.R.); Page v. Faucet, 
(1687) 78 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B.) 482; Co. of Stationers v. Seymour, (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 865 (C.B.) 
865)).  
68 Thayer, supra note 38, at 308–09. 
69 Sargent v. Lawrence, 40 S.W. 1075, 1076 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). 
70 GREENLEAF, supra note 53, at 11 (“In fine, Courts will generally take notice of whatever ought 
to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction.”). 
71 Varcoe v. Lee, 181 P. 223, 225 (Cal. 1919) (“The actual fact of the matter is, however, that 
Mission street, between Twentieth and Twenty-Second streets, is a business district, within the 
definition of the Motor Vehicle Act, beyond any possibility of question. It has been such for years. Not 
only this, but its character is known as a matter of common knowledge by any one at all familiar with 
San Francisco. Mission street, from its downtown beginning at the water front to and beyond the district 
of the city known as the Mission, is second in importance and prominence as a business street only to 
Market street. The probabilities are that every person in the courtroom at the trial, including judge, jury, 
counsel, witnesses, parties, and officers of the court, knew perfectly well what the character of the 
location was. It was not a matter about which there could be any dispute or question.”). 
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jurisdiction.72 Similarly, in 1957, Texas courts were willing to take judicial 
notice of local facts such as “the time that people in the country eat their 
dinner, the fact that a boy can stop a bicycle within a few feet, and the fact 
that most rural towns have tourist [camps].”73 Though the location of an 
address in a jurisdiction can readily be established, the general habits of the 
residents or realities of local governments may demonstrate (or exceed) the 
limits of the appropriate use of judicial notice.74 
5. Facts to Fulfill Judicial Responsibilities.—In order to fulfill 
judicial responsibilities, courts regularly took judicial notice of judicial 
records75 and existing state, federal, and foreign laws.76 On occasion this 
notice was extended to other official government documents or reports.77 In 
addition, the construction and interpretation of words also fell into 
 
72 Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 276–77 (1944) (footnotes omitted) 
(“In Varcoe v. Lee, a judge resident in San Francisco would know, as would every resident of ordinary 
intelligence, that the property fronting on Mission Street between Twentieth and Twenty-second Streets 
was occupied by business buildings and was a business district. If the case were being tried in an 
Eastern state, the matter would certainly not be commonly known.”). 
73 Hudspeth, supra note 52, at 731 (citing City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 182 S.W.2d 831, 840 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1944), aff’d, 186 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. 1945); C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Delavan, 106 
S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Reisenberg v. Hankins, 258 S.W. 904, 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1924)). 
74 For a similar comparison, see Wahrenbrock v. L.A. Transit Lines, 190 P.2d 272, 274 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1948) (taking judicial notice that Crenshaw Boulevard at 46th Street is heavily traveled); Richard 
H. Orman, Rule 201: The Use of Hearsay in Establishing Facts Sufficient for Judicial Notice, 22 COLO. 
LAW. 2535, 2535 n.2 (1993) (citing Cole v. Colo. Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13, 18 (Colo. 1963) (judicial 
notice of the history of Colorado Springs as a matter of “common knowledge”)). 
75 Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile, 186 U.S. 212, 217 (1902) (“[W]e take judicial 
notice of our own records, and, if not res judicata, we may, on the principle of stare decisis, rightfully 
examine and consider the decision in the former case as affecting the consideration of this.”). 
76 Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885) (“The law of any State of the Union, whether 
depending upon statutes or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the courts of the United States 
are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.”); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 
(1835) (“That jurisprudence is then, in no just sense, a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved, in the courts 
of the United States, by the ordinary modes of proof by which the laws of a foreign country are to be 
established, but it is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner, as the laws of the United States 
are taken notice of by these courts.”); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2573 (footnote omitted) (“The 
Federal laws of the United States (as well as of Canada) are equally the laws of each State, and hence 
the Courts of one of the States notice them, whether ordinary public acts of Congress or treaties.”); 
McNaughton, supra note 24, at 62 (“A judge is frequently permitted on his own initiative to notice, for 
example, foreign law and facts indisputably true but which enjoy only local notoriety or which require 
resort to some reference book, and the judge is required to notice such matters, if at all, only if he is 
asked to do so and is provided with the necessary supporting informal information.”). But see 
5 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2573 (“The laws of foreign nations and States—not being laws of the 
forum at all, except by casual adoption—will not be noticed.”). 
77 Recent Case, Williams v. Brooks, 109 Pac. 211 (Wash), 20 YALE L.J. 76, 76–77 (1910) 
(citations omitted) (“[I]n general the courts will take judicial notice of matters relating to government 
and its administration. So judicial notice will be taken of the government surveys and the legal sub-
divisions of the public lands. And it is well established that judicial notice will be taken of the 
population of a town as shown by the United States census.”). 
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traditional categories of judicial notice.78 As judges were routinely called 
upon to interpret legal documents such as contracts, wills, and deeds, the 
meaning of words could be noticed.79 In addition, because language 
determined causes of actions in cases involving slander, threats, or sedition, 
courts were free to interpret the language at issue by virtue of their 
position.80 As Thayer explained, “[T]he courts take notice of the ordinary 
meaning of language and of usual habits of speech; and they formerly took 
notice, not merely, as now, of the general meaning, but also of the local use 
of language.”81 
6. Commonly Known Facts.—Perhaps the most amorphous category 
of judicial notice involves facts considered to be “general knowledge.”82 
For example, one Colorado court found “[i]t is a matter of common 
knowledge that boys occasionally do fall from bicycles.”83 Many courts 
took the opportunity to declare the intoxicating nature of beer, wine, 
whisky, brandy, and gin.84 On the other hand, some courts stretched the 
concept of judicial notice to include facts relevant to a particular finding in 
a specific case. For example, one court judicially noticed the fact that a 
 
78 5 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2581 (“Another common class of instances . . . is that of the 
meanings of words and phrases and written symbols. So far as these are notorious and unquestioned, 
they are constantly found noticed.”). 
79 THAYER, supra note 24, at 290–91 (“Nothing is more familiar than the spectacle of courts 
construing wills, deeds, contracts, or statutes upon their own knowledge of the import of words; and 
nothing is more necessary.”). 
80 Thayer, supra note 38, at 294 (“A . . . class of cases relates merely to the construction of writings 
or the interpretation of words. Here the courts take notice of the ordinary meaning of words, and, as 
some of the cases of slander already cited may indicate, they formerly took judicial notice, not merely, 
as now, of the general meaning, but also of the local use of language.”). 
81 THAYER, supra note 24, at 286–87 (citing M’Gregor v. Gregory, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 811 
(Q.B.) 815). 
82 MCKELVEY, supra note 52, at 31 (“There is another group of facts of such a nature that courts 
are bound to judicially notice them. They relate to the language, customs, habits, actions, and lives of 
mankind.”); Lester B. Orfield, Judicial Notice in Federal Criminal Procedure, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 
503, 513 (1963) (“Judicial notice is taken of matters of common knowledge. It has been held that the 
common knowledge concept may be extended to knowledge common to those in a particular trade. 
Thus, the maritime practice of making up manifests from bills of lading has been judicially noticed.” 
(citing United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1946))).  
83 Orman, supra note 74, at 2535 n.3 (citing Widefield Homes, Inc. v. Griego, 416 P.2d 365, 366 
(Colo. 1966)). 
84 1 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 714 
(1911); E.H.M., Jr., Recent Case, Intoxicating Quality of Beer, 12 TEX. L. REV. 361, 361 (1934) (citing 
People v. Anderson, 123 N.W. 605, 605 (Mich. 1909); Briffitt v. State, 16 N.W. 39, 39–40 (Wis. 
1883)); see also Recent Case, Flanders v. Commonwealth, 130 S.W., 809, 20 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (1911) 
(“Other intoxicants that may be judicially noticed are whiskey.” (citing Freiberg v. State, 10 So. 703, 
704 (Ala. 1892) (whiskey); Snider v. State, 7 S.E. 631, 631 (Ga. 1888) (alcohol); State v. Packer, 80 
N.C. 439, 441–42 (1879) (wine); Johnston v. State, 23 Ohio St. 556, 557 (1873) (ale); State v. 
Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 55, 59 (1861) (brandy); Commonwealth v. Peckham, 68 Mass. 514, 514–15 
(1854) (gin))); Thayer, supra note 38, at 305 (“A knowledge will be assumed of the nature and effects 
of familiar articles of food or drink or ordinary use, and an infinite number of like matters.”). 
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particular streetcar had a “gong” because it was generally understood that 
most streetcars had gongs.85 And, sometimes judicially noticed facts were 
simply incorrect. For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated: “[T]he 
Court knows, as matter of general knowledge, and is capable of judicially 
asserting the fact, that the use of beer . . . as a beverage, is not necessarily 
hurtful, any more than the use of lemonade or ice-cream.”86 Or as the U.S. 
Supreme Court opined: 
[W]hile [tobacco’s] effects may be injurious to some, its extensive use over 
practically the entire globe is a remarkable tribute to its popularity and value. 
We are clearly of opinion that it cannot be classed with diseased cattle or 
meats, decayed fruit or other articles, the use of which is a menace to the 
health of the entire community.87 
Such was the danger of generally understood facts, because sometimes the 
generally accepted knowledge of the time was, in fact, wrong. 
7. Summary of Common Law Judicial Notice.—Judicial notice in its 
earliest form was limited to certain types of facts. Usually, the facts were 
objective, provable, and not contested in the case. Whether this caution was 
due to the relatively scarce information available through traditional 
information sources or a concern for judicial restraint in interfering with the 
adversarial system, the result was a narrow set of factual categories that 
qualified for judicial notice.88 
In addition, the legitimacy of taking judicial notice came more from 
the authority of the judge than from the source of the information. If, for 
example, there was a question about the existence of a river, it could be 
judicially noticed not because a map showed the fact (the map was 
unnecessary), but because the judge knew the river existed in that general 
location. The judge thereby acted as a proxy for the general knowledge of 
the community. Sources could support or confirm the judge’s preexisting 
general knowledge, but did not alter the underlying premise that the judge’s 
knowledge controlled. 
The common law tradition of judicial notice provided a measure of 
flexibility in a world of comparably limited information sources. Common 
law commentators acknowledged this flexibility and the potential utility of 
judicial notice. Wigmore stated, “[Judicial notice] is an instrument of a 
usefulness hitherto unimagined by judges. Let them make liberal use of it; 
 
85 Recent Case, Trial Court Reversed for Failure to Take Judicial Notice that Street Car Had 
Gong, 60 HARV. L. REV. 299, 300 (1946) (“That street cars as a class possess gongs may be conceded, 
but it does not inevitably follow that any particular street car has this characteristic at any given time.”). 
86 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 519–20 (1855). 
87 Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 345 (1900); see also Onstott, supra note 62, at 467. 
88 To be clear, there were certainly outlier decisions among the various common law courts. See 
supra text accompanying notes 86–87. Judges, on occasion, reached out to judicially notice something 
that likely was beyond the scope of the understood common law rules. Yet, by and large, the reported 
cases follow these general categories.  
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and thus avoid much of the needless failures of justice that are caused by 
the artificial impotence of judicial proceedings.”89 At the same time, others 
recognized the potential for abuse. Edmund Morgan called for caution in 
the use of this evidentiary short cut: 
There is danger of misuse and abuse of judicial notice. A judge may 
ignorantly consider a generalization drawn from the segment of human 
experience known to him to be so notoriously true as to admit of no 
reasonable question. He may erroneously regard a source of information as of 
indisputable accuracy. He may treat a half-truth as if it were the whole truth. 
These inaccuracies may not appear in the record so as to be subject to 
correction on review.90 
The Federal Rules of Evidence responded to these concerns, in part, but did 
not provide much guidance beyond incorporating the common law tradition 
of judicial deference.91 The Federal Rules limited the types of facts that 
could be noticed, and did provide some procedural protections to the 
parties, but in large measure did not resolve the debate over whether to 
broaden or restrict the use of judicial notice.92 
C. Adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 201 
The Federal Rules of Evidence formalized the common law tradition 
of judicial notice governing adjudicative facts. They did so by leaving 
much of the line drawing to judges, providing only limited guidance about 
the type of information and sources that can be judicially noticed. Rule 201 
cabins its reach to adjudicative facts, declining to comment on legislative 
facts.93 Adjudicative facts are facts that “relate to the parties”—that is, 
“who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent.”94 
 
89 5 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2583; see also THAYER, supra note 24, at 309. 
90 Morgan, supra note 72, at 292; see also id. at 274 (“That there is a priori a high degree of 
probability of the truth of a particular proposition may be a good reason for putting upon the party 
asserting its untruth the burden of producing credible evidence, or of persuading the trier, of its untruth, 
but it cannot justify a tribunal in taking judicial notice of its truth. To warrant such judicial notice the 
probability must be so great as to make the truth of the proposition notoriously indisputable among 
reasonable men.”); see, e.g., Beilin, supra note 31, at 504 (“In Iowa, 1905, for example, everyone knew 
that the disease known as Texas or splenetic fever was contagious, but most people today not involved 
in agriculture have probably never heard of the condition.” (citing Dorr Cattle Co. v. Chi. & G.W. Ry. 
Co., 103 N.W. 1003, 1005 (Iowa 1905))); Keeffe et al., supra note 26, at 665 (“What is true and what is 
undisputed are two different things. Prior to 1492 counsel would not have disputed that the world was 
flat. Yet since that date it is equally undisputed that the world is round. Nor would it have been disputed 
by Bostonians in the seventeenth century that witches and their curses were an imminent peril to the 
community. What one generation regards as beyond dispute the next may well laugh at!”). 
91 FED. R. EVID. 201(b) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
92 See e.g., John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan–Wigmore 
Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779, 787 (1961). 
93 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
94 Id. (“What, then, are ‘adjudicative’ facts? Davis refers to them as those ‘which relate to the 
parties,’ or more fully: ‘When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties—who 
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Further, these adjudicative facts must be the type of fact “not subject to 
reasonable dispute,”95 mirroring the type of facts traditionally noticed. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(1) incorporated the traditional view 
that it was appropriate to notice facts “generally known within the trial 
court’s territorial jurisdiction.”96 This general knowledge category meant 
that the traditional common law cases and commentary remain persuasive. 
Under the Federal Rules, judges still have the authority to determine if a 
fact is so well known that it can be introduced without proof.97 
Second, Rule 201(b)(2) clarified that courts could notice facts that 
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”98 This category reflected the common 
law practice of judges relying on accurate sources to determine facts that 
they personally may not have known. But this rule also broadly expanded 
the categories of judicially noticeable facts. In part, this expansion was 
necessary to accommodate new scientific facts that might be precisely 
ascertained, even if not generally known.99 Now, under Rule 201(b)(2), a 
fact does not have to be generally known if it can be accurately sourced. 
Finally, Rule 201(e) provided a procedural notice protection in order 
to give parties an opportunity to object to the proposed judicial notice. This 
procedural protection enabled a party to contest the issue and preserve the 
argument for appeal.100 Rule 201(f) further provided that in civil cases, the 
court must instruct the jury to accept any judicially noticed fact “as 
conclusive,” but in criminal cases, the judge must instruct the jury that “it 
may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”101 
 
did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent—the court or agency is performing an 
adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts. . . . Stated in other terms, 
the adjudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of adjudication. They are the 
facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They relate to the parties, their activities, their 
properties, their businesses.’” (citing 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 15.03 (1958))); see also id. (“Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case.”). 
95 FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
96 Id. 201(b)(1). 
97 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993) (“[T]heories that 
are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of 
thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.”). 
98 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
99 Thornburg, supra note 19, at 158–59 (“The drafters of the evidence rules were deeply influenced 
by academic discussion of judicial notice, which, in the mid-twentieth century, advocated a broader use 
of the device. . . . Judges and scholars were concerned that juries, left to their own devices, would refuse 
to conform their verdicts to developing science, as when blood type evidence demonstrated that a man 
could not be the biological father of a child. Based on these arguments, modern judicial notice rules 
allow specialist information to be judicially noticed, as long as it meets the requirements of 
indisputability and its source is unquestionably accurate.”).  
100 FED. R. EVID. 201(e) and accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note. 
101 Id. 201(f). 
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A great deal of scholarly commentary prefaced the adoption of Rule 
201, drawing on the well-publicized debate among Morgan, Thayer, and 
Wigmore about whether judicially noticed facts could be disputed by the 
parties at trial.102 Since then, thousands of reported cases have utilized Rule 
201 (or equivalent state rules) to judicially notice facts in trials with a wide 
variety of results.103 The debate over the proper use of judicial notice has 
evolved, but not ended. For purposes of this Article, three facets of this 
shift from the common law to the federal rules are particularly important to 
consider in determining how judicial notice should apply in the information 
age. 
First, the types of facts to be judicially noticed are largely the same. 
The phrase “not subject to reasonable dispute” mirrors the common law 
categories, and necessarily exempts many disputed facts that are central to 
any adversarial trial. Thus, the modern use of judicial notice tracks many of 
the same subject areas as the traditional common law approach involving 
geographical, scientific, medical, or other notorious or verifiable facts. 
Second, the addition of Rule 201(b)(2) alters the focus of judicial 
notice from the fact to the source of the fact. Whereas Rule 201(b)(1) 
focuses on whether a fact is generally known, Rule 201(b)(2) provides an 
alternative judicial notice mechanism based on the source involved. A 
judge may have no idea of a particular fact, but if an undisputable source is 
available, the provision allows for (or even mandates) judicial notice of that 
fact.104 
Third, Rule 201(b)(2) subtly shifts the locus of authority for judicial 
notice from the judge to the available sources. Again, the traditional 
general knowledge requirement turned on the judge’s determination of 
whether a particular fact was generally known. Judges took notice of facts 
they actually knew to be true or could be assured were true. Rule 
201(b)(2)’s emphasis on sources shifts the analysis away from the judge’s 
authority to the authority of the source to determine whether a fact can be 
judicially noticed. 
 
102 See, e.g., McNaughton, supra note 24, at 56 (“Wigmore, following Thayer, insists that judicial 
notice is solely to save time where dispute is unlikely and that a matter judicially noticed is therefore 
only ‘prima facie,’ or rebuttable, if the opponent elects to dispute it. . . . Morgan on the other hand 
defines judicial notice more narrowly, and his consequences follow from his definition. He limits 
judicial notice of fact to matters patently indisputable. And his position is that matters judicially noticed 
are not rebuttable.”); Morgan, supra note 72, at 283–87 (criticizing the Thayer–Wigmore rationale that 
allows judicially noticed facts to be contradicted); Thayer, supra note 38, at 309 (“Taking judicial 
notice does not import that the matter is indisputable. It is not necessarily anything more than a prima-
facie recognition, leaving the matter still open to controversy.”). 
103 See infra Part II (discussing cases). A Westlaw search of the federal courts database for 
references to Rule 201 and “judicial notice” in the same paragraph returns over 10,000 opinions. 
104 See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 26 (2008) (footnote omitted) (“Since judicial notice is not 
limited by the actual knowledge of the individual judge, judges may refresh their memories of matters 
properly subject to judicial notice from encyclopedias, textbooks, dictionaries, or similar publications of 
established authenticity.”). 
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These last two shifts open the door to the virtually unbounded 
potential of judicial notice in the Information Age. New sources of material 
now exist to provide accurate facts for courts to judicially notice.105 
Although still limited to the types of facts not subject to reasonable dispute, 
a wide variety of relevant facts can now be determined through online 
sources. 
This reality necessitates this article’s new vision of judicial notice. At 
the time of the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, available 
information sources were closer to the common law reality than the current 
Information Age reality. In 1824 and 1975, dictionaries, maps, 
encyclopedias, and medical references were all paper-based products.106 
The Federal Rules’ language addressing accurate sources could not 
contemplate crowdsourced, collective digital encyclopedias and the like. 
The rise in new information sources available anywhere, to anyone, blurs 
the line between facts generally known within a jurisdiction and facts that 
can be accurately and readily determined from reliable sources. 
This issue foreshadows the difficulties that arise at the intersection of 
traditional evidence rules and new technologies. In the next Part we address 
the initial meeting of judicial notice and the Information Age. 
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
The boundless avenues for fact-finding presented by the novel 
combination of an expansive judicial notice rule and the Internet’s vast 
repository of information are already on display in American courts. The 
ubiquitous practices of “Googling” unfamiliar people and things, checking 
weather and geography online, and seeking supplemental information on 
any topic through a click of a mouse are predictably moving from our 
personal lives onto the pages of judicial reports.107 The importance of 
judicial notice to this phenomenon is its ability to sweep away a series of 
evidentiary hurdles that might otherwise frustrate efforts to bring 
information obtained on the Internet into the courtroom. 
As lawyers well know, finding information is not the same as being 
able to introduce that information in court. Though the Internet is breaking 
down barriers to counsel’s access to information, a wholly separate set of 
 
105 POSNER, supra note 18, at 141–43. 
106 The first modern Internet browser that allowed easy access to resources on the Internet was 
created in the early 1990s. Development of online dictionaries, maps, encyclopedias, etc., followed this 
innovation. See Maayan Y. Vodovis, Note, Look over Your Figurative Shoulder: How to Save 
Individual Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 821 (2012) (“Tim Berners-
Lee conceived of the idea of a World Wide Web and created the first Internet browser in 1989; and in 
1992, Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina developed another browser called ‘Mosaic’ that would serve as a 
precursor for more user-friendly browsers.”). 
107 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1291 
(2012) (describing digital revolution as “a game changer” for courts that brings information “just 
fingertips and a Google search away”); Thornburg, supra note 19, at 159. 
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barriers restricts the flow of online information to judges and jurors. These 
barriers consist primarily of evidentiary rules—rules that sometimes make 
little sense when applied to facts gleaned online. 
The first hurdle to presenting online sources to jurors is authentication. 
A website can only be introduced into evidence if it is “authentic.” At its 
core, authentication is “a special aspect of relevancy”;108 a website is only 
relevant if it “is what the proponent claims it is.”109 Although much is made 
of this hurdle in the Information Age, it is, as with any relevance question, 
an easy one to surmount.110 Success generally depends not on legal or 
factual arguments, but rather the amount of time and resources a litigant 
devotes to the problem. A litigant offering a website as evidence can 
establish that the site is “authentic” by relying on the usual forms of proof: 
testimony of a witness who explains how the website was located;111 
distinctive characteristics of the site such as a logo or web address;112 and, 
if necessary, testimony from a knowledgeable witness who can link the 
site’s IP address to the sponsoring authority.113 
Authentication of online sources is an evidentiary hurdle that primarily 
necessitates an expenditure of resources (sometimes great, sometimes 
meager) and court time for little purpose. It is hard to imagine many good 
faith disputes about whether proffered evidence really is a page from 
Google Maps or WebMD. Malfeasance would be foolish. The opposing 
party can simply go to the website to verify its authenticity, and if fraud is 
detected, the consequences for the offering party are dire. Wigmore’s views 
on judicial notice fit quite neatly here. Wigmore opined that facts are 
appropriate for judicial notice when they are “capable of such instant and 
unquestionable demonstration . . . that no party would think of imposing a 
falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent adversary.”114 
 
108 FED. R. EVID. 901(a) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
109 Id. 901(a). 
110 Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 20 n.55, 27 n.77, 50–51 & n.167 (2013) 
(discussing authentication of electronic evidence); Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, Custody 
Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 222–24 (2012) (discussing 
authentication of online sources); Ira P. Robbins, Writings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-
Centric Approach to the Authentication of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 
16–35 (2012) (discussing authentication of online social media evidence). 
111 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). For example, if the website address is advertised on television (“click 
or call”). 
112 Id. 901(b)(4). 
113 Some websites are self-authenticating under the Federal Rules of Evidence. “Official 
publications” wherever found are self-authenticating so long as they “purport[] to be issued by a public 
authority.” FED. R. EVID. 902(5); Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 687–90 & n.4 (D. Md. 2008) 
(finding government websites to be self-authenticating); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 
534, 555–56 (D. Md. 2007) (describing methods that would likely be used to “authenticate exhibits 
containing information from internet websites”). Newspapers and periodicals are also self-
authenticating; their online versions will easily be authenticated under the rules. FED. R. EVID. 902(6). 
114 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5106.1 (quoting 9 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2571). 
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The other evidentiary hurdle to the admission of online sources is the 
prohibition of hearsay.115 Websites, like other written documents, consist of 
“out-of-court statements.”116 Consequently, if information from the website 
is offered for the truth of the matter that information “asserts,” it will be 
subject to a hearsay objection.117 Various hearsay exceptions may apply, 
but the parties will need to expend resources and utilize court time to 
establish their applicability. For example, the parties can subpoena Google 
or WebMD employees to attempt to lay a foundation for the introduction of 
a printout from the website as a business record.118 In many cases these 
efforts will be unavailing, however, because no hearsay exception will 
apply.119 Further, the relative confusion among litigants and judges about 
the workings of the hearsay rule, particularly as applied to novel electronic 
sources, generates uncertainty and inconsistency that can cause even 
admissible sources to be excluded (or vice versa).120 
When a party either lacks the time or resources to establish the 
authenticity of a pertinent website, or cannot lay the foundation for an 
exception to the hearsay prohibition, the legal effort to admit information 
gleaned from the website runs into a dead end. Often the dead end will 
seem pointless, bizarre and unfair. The online information may be 
extremely reliable, highly relevant, and for all practical purposes 
unobjectionable. Judges and jurors might happily rely on the information in 
their daily lives (e.g., a depiction of an intersection on Google Maps), but it 
is inadmissible nonetheless. 
Judicial notice provides a sensible path through this legal obstacle 
course. By taking judicial notice of information contained on pertinent 
websites, courts can sweep away authentication and hearsay hurdles—an 
acceptable practice, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, so long as the 
judicially noticed source is one whose “accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned.”121 Consequently, as attorneys, judges and jurors become more 
 
115 FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. 
116 Id. 801(c). 
117 Id. (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement”). A handful of the many exceptions to the broad ban on hearsay evidence will 
be useful in this context. See, e.g., id. 801(d)(2) (statements of a party); id. 803(6) (business and public 
records of regularly conducted activities); id. 803(17) (market reports and commercial compilations). 
118 Id. 803(6)(D) (establishing that the foundation for admission of business records under the rule 
can be “shown by the testimony of the custodian [of the records] or another qualified witness”). 
119 Cf. Bellin, supra note 110, at 9–10 & n.12 (2013) (discussing the need for a new hearsay 
exception that addresses proliferation of electronic statements). 
120 Id. at 26 n.75, 53–58 (discussing erroneous court rulings applying hearsay rules to electronic 
communication); Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense 
Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 344–45 (2012) (highlighting confusion created by the emergence 
of electronic communication previously unimagined by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
121 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). The overarching requirement of the rule is that the fact not be “subject 
to reasonable dispute”; one of the two means of meeting that standard under the Rule is if the fact can 
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comfortable with the reliability of information found on the Internet, and 
lawyers recognize the power of Rule 201 to provide a legal hook for its 
admission, judicial notice could become a ubiquitous mechanism for 
introducing the knowledge of the Internet to litigation. In fact, existing case 
law already provides a window into the online future of judicial notice. 
A. Judicial Notice and Public Information on Government Websites 
Judicial notice of online sources frequently involves public 
information on government websites. Courts often take judicial notice of 
such information with little discussion (or apparent recognition) of 
potential objections to doing so. In Askew v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, the Court of Federal Claims took judicial notice of the symptoms 
of an unusual medical condition, as reflected in an online publication by the 
National Institutes of Health.122 Armed with this knowledge, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff would not have known (for statute of 
limitations purposes) of the nature of his claim at the onset of symptoms 
because of the ambiguous nature of the disorder’s typical symptoms.123 
Often, as in Askew, judicially noticed facts are central to resolving 
critical issues. A district court in Texas took judicial notice of “the 
appraised fair-market value of the property” at issue in the litigation as 
“published on [the] Harris County Appraisal District’s website.”124 In Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Favino, the district court for the Northern District of 
Ohio dismissed a claim against Wells Fargo because the statute underlying 
the claim did not apply to “national banks,” and the court, after reviewing a 
list on the “Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s website,” took 
judicial notice that Wells Fargo is, in fact, a “national bank.”125 Courts have 
taken judicial notice of demographic information published online by the 
Census Bureau, such as “the racial breakdown for the Memphis 
metropolitan area population.”126 In Davis v. Nice, the court took judicial 
 
be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 
Id. 
122 No. 10-767V, 2012 WL 2061804, at *1 n.3, *5 (Fed. Cl. May 17, 2012).  
123 Id.; see also Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking judicial 
notice of description of Lyme Disease published on “the website of the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (‘CDC’), a U.S. federal agency under the Department of Health and Human Services”). 
124 Kew v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. H-11-2824, 2012 WL 1414978, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 
2012). 
125 No. 1:10 CV 571, 2011 WL 1256771, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2011); see also Global BTG 
L.L.C. v. Nat’l Air Cargo, Inc., No. CV 11-1657 RSWL (JCGx), 2011 WL 2672337, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
June 29, 2011) (taking judicial notice of a “print-out of an internet search for business entities on the 
California Secretary of State website”). 
126 Wilson v. Ill. Cent. R.R., No. 09 C 7392, 2012 WL 135446, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2012) 
(employment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); see J&J Sports 
Prods., Inc. v. Cal City Post No. 476, No. 1:10-cv-00762 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 2946178, at *8 n.5 (E.D. 
Cal. July 21, 2011) (taking judicial notice of city populations obtained from “the Internet website for 
the United States Census Bureau”); Benavidez v. City of Irving, Tex., 638 F. Supp. 2d 709, 721 (N.D. 
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notice that the defendant was, “[a]ccording to the City of Akron Police 
Department website,” the “current Akron Chief of Police.”127 A tax court 
took judicial notice of facts found in a PowerPoint presentation located on 
a local government website.128 The presentation discussed the general 
implications of donating property to the fire department, and the court 
relied on that discussion to support its conclusion as to the legal 
consequences of a specific taxpayer’s donation.129 Perhaps the most 
inventive example of judicial notice to date comes from a court that, after 
noting the tracking number of an employment discrimination plaintiff’s 
right-to-sue letter, “went to the United States Postal Service’s website and 
entered the tracking number, which revealed [the date] that the right-to-sue 
letter was delivered.”130 The court then deemed the plaintiff’s suit untimely 
because it was filed more than ninety days after the letter was received 
(according to the Internet).131 
B. Judicial Notice from Nongovernmental Websites 
Courts are also taking judicial notice of information contained on 
nongovernmental websites. Courts take judicial notice of medical 
information published on sites like the MayoClinic website,132 stock prices 
reflected in Yahoo! Finance,133 facts contained in news reports found on 
websites of CNN, BBC, and Yahoo!,134 and information contained in online 
 
Tex. 2009) (taking “judicial notice of [a] Census Bureau’s February 2009 publication” located on the 
website www.census.gov). 
127 No. 5:12cv1002, 2012 WL 3961236, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2012). 
128 Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395, 416 n.21 (2012). 
129 Id.; see also Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Cent., 664 F.3d 632, 649 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(suggesting that trial court could properly have relied on the “Laffey Matrix . . . a chart of hourly rates 
for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area that was prepared by the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia to be used in fee-shifting cases” to calculate attorney’s 
fees, but the court had to provide parties an “opportunity to respond” to the court’s use of the matrix); 
Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (ruling that district court erred in declining to take 
judicial notice of fact that was readily confirmable on a federal government website—that “the NPRC 
maintains medical records of military personnel”); Joyce v. N. Metro Task Force, No. 10-cv-00649-
CMA-MJW, 2011 WL 2669162, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. July 7, 2011) (taking judicial notice “of the fact 
that HIDTA is a program within the Office of National Drug Control Policy” via website maintained by 
federal government regarding efforts to suppress traffic in illegal drugs). 
130 Ananias v. Stratton, No. 11-3274, 2012 WL 1434880, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2012). 
131 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (setting ninety-day time limit for suit). 
132 Pérez v. Saint John’s Sch., 814 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 n.7 (D.P.R. 2011). 
133 Grimes v. Navigant Consulting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 906, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
134 Chhetry v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 490 F.3d 196, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) 
(stating, in an immigration appeal, that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) could take judicial 
notice of “changed country conditions based on news articles found on yahoo.com, or the websites of 
CNN and BBC News,” and indicating that the BIA, like the Second Circuit itself, could “exercise 
independent discretion to take judicial notice of . . . changes in a country’s politics” because the articles 
accessed on the Internet came “from reputable news organizations”); see also Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 
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flight schedules.135 In a trademark suit, a court took judicial notice of the 
fame and notoriety of “The Terrible Towel”—a symbol of the Pittsburgh 
Steelers football team.136 The court relied on the “Wikipedia Free Internet 
Encyclopedia” for this finding, which noted that the towel “has been taken 
to the peak of Mount Everest and into space on the International Space 
Station and that ‘it is clearly the most famous sports rally towel in use.’”137 
To rebut a Congressman’s claim that a recently enacted law was damaging 
his standing among his constituents, a court relied on a political almanac 
available online to take judicial notice of the high percentage of the vote 
the candidate won in a recent election.138 
Corporate websites containing pertinent information are another 
common source of information that is judicially noticed. A court took 
judicial notice of corporate relationships between insurance companies 
involved in the litigation before it, as delineated on one of their websites, a 
source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”139 In a parole 
revocation proceeding, a trial court “did a Google search” to confirm the 
suspicion that many variants of yellow hats are available for sale (the 
parole revocation was based on a bank robbery by a person wearing a 
yellow hat).140 Another court visited Facebook to take judicial notice of the 
steps necessary to sign in for a Facebook account.141 
For judges who anticipate avoiding the pitfalls of online judicial notice 
by ignoring the concept, it is worth noting that the judicial reports include a 
prominent opinion reversing a trial court for refusing to take judicial notice 
of Internet sources. In O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., the Tenth 
Circuit reversed a district court’s ruling with respect to damages because 
“the district court abused its discretion by failing to take judicial notice of 
the actual earnings history provided by Northrop Grumman on the 
[I]nternet.”142 After all, Rule 201 states that a court “must take judicial 
 
10-CV-00569A(F), 2012 WL 503810, at *11 & n.10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) (taking judicial notice 
of worth of Facebook via article available on Wall Street Journal’s internet site). 
135 United States v. Allick, No. 2011-020, 2012 WL 32630, at *4 n.7 (D.V.I. Jan. 5, 2012) (taking 
judicial notice of airline flights between Puerto Rico and St. Croix reflected on “www.flightstats.com” 
to refute defendant’s claim that flights between the two locations were uncommon). 
136 AVS Found. v. Eugene Berry Enter., No. 11 CV 01084, 2011 WL 6056903, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 6, 2011). 
137 Id. 
138 Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 885 n.8 (10th Cir. 2001). 
139 Total Benefits Planning Agency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 630 F. Supp. 2d 842, 
849 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
140 United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 178, 180 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The District Court’s independent 
Internet search served only to confirm this common sense supposition.”). 
141 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
142 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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notice” once it is “supplied with the necessary information,” and there is no 
exception for online information.143 
1. Google Maps.—Probably the most common online source of 
judicially noticed facts is Google Maps. Numerous judicial opinions in both 
civil and criminal cases reflect trial and appellate courts144 taking judicial 
notice of information found on the website.145 Courts often rely on Google 
Maps to establish the distance between two geographic points (e.g., a 
defendant’s location and the scene of the crime) referenced in the 
litigation.146 Judicial uses of Google Maps are varied, and the case law 
 
143 FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(2). 
144 People v. Clark, 940 N.E.2d 755, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (emphasizing that taking judicial 
notice on appeal cannot substitute for any failing in prosecution’s case at trial, and concluding that “we 
take judicial notice that the park is, generally, north of the intersection, but only for the purpose of 
understanding the statements made at trial by the witnesses and by the trial court”). See generally 
1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 2:8 (3d ed. 2007). 
145 Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“Courts commonly use [I]nternet mapping tools to take judicial notice of distance and geography.”); 
Kemp v. Zavaras, No. 09-cv-00295-WYD-MJW, 2010 WL 1268094, at *2 n.3 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010) 
(taking judicial notice of driving distance between “two points located in the record using mapping 
services, such as Google Maps (http://maps.google.com/), whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned”); United States v. Brown, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 n.1 (D. Nev. 2009) (“Courts have 
generally taken judicial notice of facts gleaned from [I]nternet mapping tools such as Google Maps or 
Mapquest.”); Clark, 940 N.E.2d at 766 (stating “case law supports the proposition that information 
acquired from mainstream Internet sites such as Map Quest and Google Maps is reliable enough to 
support a request for judicial notice”). 
146 McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on judicial notice of 
Google Maps information that “[i]t is about 138 miles from Bannock County, Idaho to Salt Lake City, 
Utah”); United States v. Harmon, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1160 (D.N.M. 2012) (relying on Google Maps 
to take judicial notice that “[t]he distance between San Francisco and Albuquerque is approximately 
1,086 miles traveling on Interstate Highway 40”); Hooper v. Clark, No. CIV S-08-1773-TJB, 2011 WL 
445510, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011) (evaluating tactical choice of counsel in part by determining, 
through Google Maps, that the witness’s testimony would have placed the defendant close to a burglary 
scene—a precise distance of “approximately 0.4 miles . . . or an eight minute walk”); United States v. 
Sessa, Nos. 92-CR-351(ARR), 97-CV-2079 (ARR), 2011 WL 256330, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2011) 
(rejecting claim that reports constituted Brady material because discrepancies in addresses pertained to 
locations that, according to Google Maps, were “merely a few miles apart”); Access 4 All, Inc. v. 
Boardwalk Regency Corp., Nos. 08-3817 (RMB/JS), 08-4679 (RMB/JS), 2010 WL 4860565, at *6 n.13 
(D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (taking judicial notice via Google Maps that “all three beach towns are located 
over one hour from Atlantic City”); Rindfleisch, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 259 n.13 (taking judicial notice of 
travel distances in evaluating request for change of venue); Warwick v. Univ. of the Pac., No. C 08-
03904 CW, 2010 WL 2680817, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (taking “judicial notice that Ukiah is 
approximately 100 miles from San Quentin, a drive of approximately two hours” and citing Google 
Maps); Super 8 Motels, Inc. v. Rahmatullah, No. 1:07-cv-01358-DFH-DML, 2009 WL 2905463, at *8 
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 2009) (taking judicial notice via Google Maps and Google Earth of distance between 
franchises in contract dispute); People v. Stiff, 904 N.E.2d 1174, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (taking 
judicial notice of short distance victim travelled after injuries to support conclusion that victim’s 
statement should have been allowed as an excited utterance). Courts do this even for locations in 
foreign countries. See, e.g., Rezende v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 09 Civ. 9392(HB)(DF), 2011 
WL 1584607, at *20 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011) (taking “judicial notice that ACF Rivera Center is 
approximately a 10-minute drive from Rezende’s home address” and citing Google Maps). 
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reflects reliance on not just the basic map feature, but also Google’s 
satellite imagery to discern the physical contours of an area and nearby 
landmarks.147 Courts also take judicial notice of the estimates of driving (or 
walking) times provided by the website.148 In at least one case, a court 
appeared to rely on information that could only be obtained through Google 
Street View, which provides street level photographs of various 
locations.149 
By taking judicial notice, courts (and litigators) skip over thorny 
evidentiary questions such as: are the maps accurate (or in authentication 
terms, do they reflect what they purport to show) and what hearsay 
exception allows the court to consider out-of-court statements by Google as 
to relative locations, driving distances, and so on, for the truth of the matter 
asserted. Further, judicial notice allows the parties to introduce information 
procured from the Internet without the expense and delay of subpoenaing 
Google employees. 
In the opinions to date, there seems to be little controversy as to the 
propriety of using Google Maps to judicially notice facts that would 
otherwise be proven by the parties. Courts see the practice as self-evidently 
proper, often citing Justice Jackson’s assertion in a 1952 case: “We may, of 
course, take judicial notice of geography.”150 The steady march of 
technology has rendered the implications of Justice Jackson’s view that 
judges could recognize that driving to New York City was impossible 
 
147 United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (taking judicial notice of “a 
Google map and satellite image” for “the purpose of determining the general location” of a home that 
was the subject of a suppression motion); United States v. Lente, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 n.7 
(D.N.M. 2010) (taking judicial notice “of the geographic data contained on the Isleta Pueblo’s website 
as well as Google maps of the Isleta Pueblo and surrounding areas” for purposes of concluding at 
sentencing that a drunk driver’s conduct created a high danger to others); United States v. Sedillo, No. 
CR 08-1419 JB, 2010 WL 965743, at *3 n.2 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2010) (taking judicial notice sua sponte 
that a road was well traveled in evaluating suppression motion, based on “the Court’s personal 
experience [of] . . . New Mexico, supplemented by a search via Google Maps to pinpoint precisely 
where, on Louisiana Boulevard, 330 Louisiana is located”); United States v. Stewart, No. 3:07cr51, 
2007 WL 2437514, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2007) (taking judicial notice of features of area for 
purposes of suppression motion). 
148 Dynka v. Norfolk S. Ry. Corp., No. 09-4854, 2010 WL 2490683, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 
2010) (“The distances listed here are driving distances, and were calculated using Google Maps 
(www.maps.google.com, last accessed June 13, 2010), as is common practice.”). 
149 Daniels v. 1710 Realty L.L.C., No. 10-CV-0022 (RER), 2011 WL 3648245, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 17, 2011) (taking judicial notice, based on Google Maps, that with respect to a property at issue in 
the litigation “the commercial units occupy the ground [story], and the residential units occupy the top 
three [stories]”).  
150 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 344 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); 
see, e.g., Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1182 n.1 (“We take judicial notice of a Google map and satellite 
image . . . for the purpose of determining the general location of the home.”); Dynka, 2010 WL 
2490683, at *1 & n.2 (noting driving distances calculated by Google Maps). 
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without passing through “either tunnels, viaducts or bridges,”151 far more 
sweeping than the Justice likely could have imagined. 
2. Wikipedia.—Opposite Google Maps on the spectrum of online 
sources accepted by courts is Wikipedia. “Citing Wikipedia is as 
controversial as it is common.”152 Wikipedia is a user-generated online 
encyclopedia, which means that, with limited exceptions, anyone can edit 
its entries.153 Though courts often cite Wikipedia to support their reasoning, 
they have generally declined requests to take judicial notice of facts found 
within its entries.154 Although written analysis is sparse, courts may be 
concluding that Wikipedia is not a “source[] whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.”155 At least one commentator agrees.156 Lee 
Peoples reviewed hundreds of cases that referenced Wikipedia and located 
two where judicial notice, via Wikipedia, was granted. In one, a court 
relied on Wikipedia to take judicial notice that “urea is an acid having a 
very low pH.”157 In another, a court relied on Wikipedia to take judicial 
notice of the “fact that the South Philadelphia Sports Complex houses the 
city’s professional sports teams, and incorporates the currently-named 
Wachovia Center, Wachovia Spectrum, Lincoln Financial Field, and 
Citizens Bank Park.”158 Professor Peoples criticizes these cases, arguing 
that Wikipedia is not a source “whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 
questioned,”159 and thus “information obtained from Wikipedia should not 
be judicially noticed in the future.”160 Aside from the few examples noted 
above, the courts so far seem to agree. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Courts are already taking judicial notice of information found 
online.161 The real concern is the haphazard and poorly theorized method by 
 
151 Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 344 (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
152 Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 285 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (Voros, J., concurring). 
153 About, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last updated May 14, 2014). 
154 Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 7–13 
(2009) (“Most courts have wisely refused to take judicial notice of Wikipedia content.”). 
155 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
156 Peoples, supra note 154, at 14–15 (“Wikipedia entries are not proper subjects for judicial notice 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) because they are not indisputable.”). 
157 Id. at 13 (quoting Helen of Troy, L.P. v. Zotos Corp., 235 F.R.D. 634. 639–40 (W.D. Tex. 
2006)). 
158 Id. at 14 (quoting Aquila v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No 07-2696, 2008 WL 4899359, at *1 
n.4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2008)). 
159 Id. at 16. 
160 Id. at 14.  
161 See Margolis, supra note 9, at 194 (arguing that the “time for lamenting the changes wrought by 
the Internet and resisting the use of electronic materials has passed” and that it is now “time to develop 
more nuanced norms for when and how electronic materials should be used”). 
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which courts apply judicial notice rules to the Internet.162 The blame for this 
does not fall solely on the courts. The absence of a framework for the 
application of judicial notice is a tradition that predates the Internet. 
Treatises mirror the case law they describe, providing, “with some 
trepidation,” ad hoc samplings of the “numerous and varied” examples of 
judicial notice in the cases, but little analysis of patterns in the 
jurisprudence or guidance about the propriety of these rulings.163 Outside of 
the treatises, scholars have grown silent on the topic of judicial notice, a 
notable change for a topic that was once a central battleground of academic 
debate.164 A framework for judicial notice is long overdue. This new 
framework could bring consistency and clarity to judicial notice in the 
digital era, while also tethering the process to Rule 201. Channeling the 
application of judicial notice through the proposed framework will enhance 
fairness and legitimacy and, potentially, improve “the search for truth.”165 
After first highlighting some potential benefits of a consistent and rational 
application of judicial notice to Internet sources, this Part sketches the 
contours of a proposed framework for analyzing judicial notice in the 
Information Age. 
A. Potential Benefits of Judicial Notice of Internet Sources 
Several factors make the prospect of more widespread and rational 
judicial notice of online sources attractive. Most obviously, the exercise 
can bring reliable information into the decision-making process, leading to 
more accurate determinations. In addition, online information is available 
to everyone and easy to access.166 Counsel need not worry about whether 
the Internet will cooperate, assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, or slant its 
story when approached by one party or the other to litigation. Google Maps 
cooperates with all on equal terms—it does not change its story based on 
the inquirer. Further, using the Internet is largely free of charge (or, more 
precisely, free of incremental costs). Even websites that do assess a fee are 
 
162 Thornburg, supra note 19, at 161 (noting that “the law regarding judicial notice is . . . untidy”); 
21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5103.3 (noting that “[o]ne of the impediments to developing 
the scope of Rule 201” is that in “many cases . . . courts take judicial notice without mentioning Rule 
201 and without explaining why it does not apply”). 
163 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201:3 (7th ed. 2012) (providing 
“typical and by no means exclusive illustrations” of judicial notice based on sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned); 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5106.3 (“We follow with 
some trepidation the practice of treatises that collect and categorize cases holding that facts were 
properly or improperly noticed as ‘ascertainable facts.’”). 
164 See supra Part I.C. 
165 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
166 See LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AS A DIVERSION AND 
DESTINATION 6 (2011), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2011/12/PIP_Logging-on-for-
fun.pdf; cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (expressing “constitutional understanding that 
each person . . . is entitled to equal justice under the law”). 
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generally less expensive than analogous sources of information, such as 
experts. An overburdened, under-motivated, resource-strapped public 
defender can review, and seek judicial notice of, the same websites as the 
most high-powered, well-funded white-collar defender. Finally, by 
removing unnecessary evidentiary obstacles, judicial notice preserves court 
time and resources, while also decreasing the burden on witnesses who 
might otherwise have to testify on uncontroversial points, such as the 
authenticity of a printout from Google Maps or the owner of the website, 
“www.mcdonalds.com.” 
Another consideration is that jurors already have independent access to 
online information. There is, consequently, no guarantee that courts can 
shut off access to the Internet even if they want to. Jurors confused about 
the geography where an incident took place, the weather on the date in 
question, or the chemical properties of a substance will be sorely tempted 
to look it up themselves. The temptation has always existed for jurors to do 
independent research, but the ease with which they can do so has changed 
dramatically.167 Judges warn jurors not to visit the crime scene, and jurors 
(mostly) comply.168 But will they visit the crime scene remotely via Google 
Maps? It may be better to funnel this curiosity through an open, transparent 
and (more likely) accurate process of judicial notice, than to leave it 
unregulated and in the shadows. 
B. Deriving the Contours of a New Framework 
Once the necessity for a modern framework to regulate judicial notice 
is accepted, the next question concerns the contours of that framework. The 
framework’s parameters in turn depend on a recognition of the dangers of 
introducing online information into courts. Many of those dangers are 
familiar. Principally, courts ought not take judicial notice of inaccurate 
information. Inaccuracy can result from the poor quality of the source 
material or bias on the part of its authors. Because taking judicial notice 
usually precludes cross-examination of the material’s creator and the 
material will have a judicial imprimatur, inaccuracy is a critical concern. 
Online sources are often authored anonymously and not (necessarily) by 
experts in the subject matter. Websites can be maintained fairly cheaply, 
and their editors may not possess sufficient resources to determine 
information accurately, being satisfied instead to publish information that is 
possibly true, “truthy,”169 or close enough. Other dangers are new, or 
exacerbated, in the online world. Information on the Internet changes 
rapidly and can be manipulated more readily than physical sources. For 
example, it is unlikely that an interested party could write and publish a 
 
167 Hoffmeister, supra note 19, at 422; Morrison, supra note 19, at 1586–88. 
168 Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1135 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (reviewing challenge to murder 
conviction based on juror’s unauthorized visit to crime scene).  
169 Truthiness, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truthiness (last modified Apr. 16, 2014). 
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book, sell the book to a nearby library, and subsequently seek judicial 
notice of information from the book in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
Someone could, however, create a website in a short time frame solely to 
influence ongoing litigation.170 
Identifying the principal dangers of judicial notice of online material 
goes a long way toward signaling the types of factors that courts should 
focus on when determining whether judicial notice is proper. This is not, 
however, an exercise in policymaking. Any approach to judicial notice 
must be faithful to the text and intent of Rule 201. And although the rule is 
sparse, it provides guidance nonetheless. 
C. The Framework 
A much-needed new framework for analysis would increase 
predictability and consistency in judicial rulings and ensure that courts 
taking judicial notice of online sources adhere to the requirements of Rule 
201.171 This Part articulates a new framework for judicial notice in the 
Information Age. Importantly, the proposed framework does not require 
any changes to existing law. It simply guides courts as they apply the 
familiar dictates of Rule 201 to unfamiliar forms of online evidence. 
Assuming a relevant “adjudicative fact”172 can be gleaned from an 
online source, the propriety of judicial notice hinges on the reliability of the 
source. Rule 201 requires a court to take judicial notice upon request if the 
fact sought to be noticed “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . 
can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”173 A vast array of facts available online 
may be capable of being “accurately and readily determined” in ways that 
were likely never imagined when Rule 201 was drafted. The key analytical 
question is whether the reliability of the source from which the fact can be 
determined can “reasonably be questioned.” 
To answer this question, courts should examine at least three attributes 
of the online source: (1) knowledge of the subject matter, (2) independence 
from relevant bias, and (3) incentive to ensure accuracy. No source, online 
or otherwise, is without possibility of error. A candid assessment of these 
three factors, however, will result in numerous determinations that 
 
170 E.g., Teri Thompson et al., News Uncovers Bizarre Plot by Melky to Use Fake Website and 
Duck Drug Suspension, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 19, 2012, at 4 (“Melky Cabrera created a fictitious 
website and a nonexistent product designed to prove he inadvertently took [a] banned substance . . . .”). 
171 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5106.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2013) (noting that “[s]ome 
courts, without any consideration of the issues raised, have used Internet materials as sources of judicial 
notice”). 
172 For a discussion of “adjudicative facts,” see supra Part I.C. 
173 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). Judicial notice is also required if the fact is not subject to reasonable 
dispute and “is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction.” Id. 201(b)(1). 
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reputable Internet sources come within Rule 201’s scope and can, thus, 
help fact-finders resolve disputes in courtrooms across the country.174 
1. Knowledge of the Subject Matter.—The most obvious criterion for 
evaluating the reliability of an Internet source is to assess the expertise of 
its author. Many websites exist solely to disseminate the findings of 
exceedingly qualified experts to the public.175 Websites maintained by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration176 or other weather 
forecasting sites fall into this category, as do other government sources 
such as the Bureau of Justice Statistics.177 Medical websites like WebMD 
also provide expert knowledge to the masses.178 In assessing whether the 
accuracy of information drawn from these sites can “reasonably be 
questioned” under Rule 201, the author’s expertise is of critical importance. 
Courts should be less willing to take judicial notice of information 
appearing on websites run by anonymous or relatively unknown authors, or 
authors who possess no discernible expertise. 
The benefit to the fact finder of hearing from witnesses with pertinent 
knowledge or specialized expertise is well accepted and constitutes a 
recurring theme in the evidence rules. The Federal Rules require all 
witnesses, other than experts, to testify from “personal knowledge.”179 
Rules 701 and 702 bar most witnesses from providing opinion testimony, 
but exempt “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert” from that 
prohibition.180 Expert witnesses are given wide latitude in testifying; unlike 
 
174 Cf. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Favino, No. 1:10 CV 571, 2011 WL 1256771, at *9 n.2 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 31, 2011) (stating that courts have interpreted Rule 201 to permit the taking of judicial notice 
of “public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet”). 
175 City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 655 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(taking judicial notice of relevant definition in the case by reference to the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) website). 
176 E.g., NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, http://www.noaa.gov/wx.html 
(last visited May 14, 2014).  
177 E.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.gov/ (last visited May 14, 2014); see also Gent 
v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of “information . . . 
taken primarily from the website of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (‘CDC’), a U.S. 
federal agency under the Department of Health and Human Services” and explaining that the 
information is “not subject to reasonable dispute”); J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Cal City Post, No. 476, 
No. 1:10-cv-00762 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 2946178, at *8 n.5 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (“The United 
States Census Bureau is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and . . . the Internet 
website for the United States Census Bureau, and facts included therein, are subject to judicial notice.”); 
Favino, 2011 WL 1256771, at *9 (taking judicial notice of fact that the Wells Fargo is a “national 
bank” by reviewing a list on the “Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s website”); Total Benefits 
Planning Agency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 630 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(citations omitted) (“Public records and government documents are generally considered ‘not to be 
subject to reasonable dispute.’ This includes public records and government documents available from 
reliable sources on the Internet.”). 
178 WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com (last visited May 14, 2014).  
179 FED. R. EVID. 602. 
180 Id. 702. 
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all other witnesses, experts can base their testimony on hearsay and other 
inadmissible information.181 These rules do not apply directly to the judicial 
notice inquiry, of course, but their emphasis on the importance of pertinent 
knowledge and expertise support the broader connection between 
knowledge or expertise and the reliability of a particular source. 
2. Independence from Relevant Bias.—In assessing whether the 
accuracy of a source can “reasonably be questioned,” courts should next 
consider potential bias. A source may possess the requisite knowledge, but 
nevertheless be unreliable because it presents information in a misleading 
manner.182 Potential bias will, consequently, often be fatal to a request for 
judicial notice because the judicial notice rules do not contemplate 
subsequent argument and cross-examination about the noticed facts. The 
Supreme Court’s classic response in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to the argument that Rule 702 (as interpreted) 
allowed too much “junk” science into evidence hinged on the notion that 
simply admitting expert testimony does not mean it will be taken as true by 
the jury.183 Instead, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”184 In 
the context of judicial notice, the adversary system cannot remedy the 
admission of “shaky” evidence. In fact, Rule 201 commands that in civil 
cases “the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as 
conclusive.”185 Consequently, in circumstances where a knowledgeable 
source has an incentive to shade the facts presented in a manner that 
matters to the litigation, judicial notice becomes problematic. 
Straightforward examples include efforts to take judicial notice of 
information contained on websites for trade associations, companies, and 
political advocacy groups.186 
Importantly, for bias to matter in this context, it must be “relevant” 
bias. If the potential bias cuts against (rather than in the same direction as) 
the judicial notice sought, it can be discounted—although not ignored 
completely. For example, the New York City Police Department’s website 
 
181 Id. 701–03; accord id. 602 (requiring witnesses to testify based on “personal knowledge,” but 
stating that the rule “does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703”). 
182 Cf. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2008) (declining to rely on studies 
regarding inconsistency of punitive damage awards because the underlying “research was funded in part 
by Exxon”). 
183 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). 
184 Id. at 596. 
185 FED. R. EVID. 201(f). 
186 United States ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2003) 
(declining to take judicial notice “of information posted on three private websites dedicated to the 
anthrax vaccine” because the “information contained on these websites is subject to reasonable dispute” 
and “the Court could not verify the information found on these websites for accuracy or authenticity”). 
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constitutes a plausible source for statistics regarding crime in the city.187 A 
critic, however, might argue that the NYPD has an incentive to skew these 
statistics to suggest less crime than actually exists.188 If, then, a public 
defender seeks to use the crime statistics to show the prevalence of crime in 
a certain neighborhood, the identified bias cuts against the fact sought to be 
established, and a court could reasonably conclude that the identified bias 
does not undermine the evidentiary value of the proffered information.189 
The concept of allowing evidence from biased sources so long as the 
potential bias cuts against the proffered showing is familiar in the rules. 
Hearsay exceptions, for example, often permit statements from biased 
out-of-court speakers if the statements cut against the grain of the witness’s 
bias, but not otherwise.190 
3. Motivation to Ensure the Accuracy of the Posted Information.—A 
well-informed source, free from bias, may still disseminate inaccurate 
information. Incentives matter. Taking the time to collect and post accurate 
information is an arduous task. Those websites that are more likely to 
invest the resources to get information right are sites that will suffer 
consequences when the information they disseminate is inaccurate. 
Different websites operate under different incentives. The primary 
incentive for accuracy on the Internet, however, is monetary. Websites 
thrive on viewers, seeking “hits” to maintain advertising revenue and 
prestige. The websites that attract viewers based on the reliability of their 
information have an incentive to ensure accuracy.191 Websites are tested 
countless times a day, and visitors will not return if the sites fail to provide 
the accurate information they seek. Google Maps must accurately portray 
the desired route, or people will turn elsewhere (to other Internet sources or 
other mapping services entirely, including paper maps), and Google will 
 
187 See generally Crime Statistics, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/
crime_prevention/crime_statistics.shtml (last visited May 14, 2014). 
188 E.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 796 (2010) (“[Q]uestions have been raised about the veracity of the 
NYPD’s crime statistics program . . . .”); Joseph Goldstein, Audit of City Crime Statistics Finds 
Mistakes by Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013, at A21.  
189 O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (trial court should 
have taken judicial notice of earnings information from Northrop Grumman’s website and asserting that 
Northrup Grumman had failed to explain “why its own website’s posting of historical retirement fund 
earnings is unreliable”).  
190 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (exempting various forms of “opposing party’s statement[s],” including 
co-conspirator statements, from hearsay ban); id. 804(b)(3) (statements against interest); cf. id. 803(6); 
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943) (business records inadmissible when prepared for 
purposes of litigation). 
191 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, § 2:5 (recognizing “continual use” and 
“commercial pressure” as mechanisms that may ensure the accuracy of Internet sources to a degree that 
judicial notice is proper). 
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lose revenue.192 “Weather.com” will quickly fade from prominence if on 
days when freezing rain creates hazardous conditions, the site predicts it 
will be sunny and clear. A website that purports to be the “periodic table on 
the web”193 will have trouble maintaining its existence if it incorrectly 
represents the atomic number of boron. None of this, of course, is to say 
that information contained on these websites is always correct. But a strong 
incentive to ensure the accuracy of factual information posted on a website 
strengthens the claim that a source is one whose “accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned” under Rule 201. 
Similar to bias, an independent incentive to maintain the accuracy of 
data is a familiar consideration in the evidence rules. This is the primary 
consideration in the privileged position given to “public records” and 
“business records” in the hearsay rules. These data compilations are 
admissible even if hearsay, and can often be self-authenticating.194 The 
rationale for these exceptions is that “such documents have a high degree 
of reliability because businesses [and government officials] have incentives 
to keep accurate records.”195 A similar sentiment can be found in the 
hearsay exception for “[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other 
compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in 
particular occupations.”196 The Advisory Committee notes to the exception 
explain that the “basis of trustworthiness” for this type of evidence is 
“general reliance by the public or by a particular segment of it, and the 
motivation of the compiler to foster reliance by being accurate.”197 The 
sentiment seamlessly maps onto the judicial notice analysis. 
4. Other Factors.—The above considerations are not exhaustive. 
Rule 201 makes no claim to cabin the factors that can be considered in 
assessing the propriety of judicial notice. Consequently, a court can take 
into account other factors in determining whether an online source’s 
 
192 See David Pogue, A Map App, as Sleek as iPhone 5, Is Often Off, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at 
B1. 
193 See Periodic Table of the Elements, WEBELEMENTS, http://www.webelements.com (last visited 
May 14, 2014). 
194 FED. R. EVID. 803(6)–(10) (hearsay exceptions); id. 902(1)–(2) (authentication); id. 902 (self-
authentication); cf. id. 702 advisory committee’s notes (noting as a factor in determining reliability of 
expert testimony, whether the expert will testify “about matters growing naturally and directly out of 
research they have conducted independent of the litigation”). 
195 Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 341 (10th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429, 1433–34 (10th Cir. 1986) (“The business records exception is based on 
a presumption of accuracy, accorded because the information is part of a regularly conducted activity, 
kept by those trained in the habits of precision, and customarily checked for correctness, and because of 
the accuracy demanded in the conduct of the nation’s business.”). 
196 FED. R. EVID. 803(17). 
197 Id. Advisory Committee’s Notes. Interestingly, this obscure hearsay exception provides some 
authority for admitting online information over a hearsay objection, although it does not appear to have 
received any attention from scholars or courts.  
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accuracy can “reasonably be questioned.” The source may have a history of 
unreliability, it may unintentionally announce its inaccuracy through 
apparent errors, or consciously highlight its own pertinent flaws.198 The 
existence of parallel sources (online or not) through which a fact can be 
verified,199 or a history of courts taking judicial notice of a certain website, 
may also be persuasive. 
Like there were in the common law history of judicial notice, there 
will inevitably be errors in application of this framework. But the key 
factor is to provide straightforward guidance for trial court analysis and a 
clear record for appellate review. To this end, Rule 201 requires that 
parties, upon request, have an opportunity “to be heard on the propriety of 
taking judicial notice.” In the hearing, a party opposed to judicial notice of 
the fact should be able to raise any plausible objection. The court’s inquiry 
should be akin to a common variant of the “reasonable doubt” instruction 
in criminal cases: “a doubt for which you can give a reason.”200 All sources 
can be impugned in fanciful and speculative ways. The question for a court 
confronted with a request to take judicial notice of a fact found on the 
Internet is simply whether there is some reason to question the source’s 
accuracy. If there is, such as a relevant potential bias, a lack of subject 
matter expertise, a history of unreliability, or an absence of incentive to 
maintain accurate records, the request must be denied. 
D. Submitting Information to Support a Finding of Judicial Notice 
As a general matter, the proponent of judicial notice will need to 
provide the judge with the “necessary information” establishing the 
accuracy of the proffered source.201 The information establishing accuracy 
need not be admissible and can consist of documentation from the site, 
articles and descriptions of the website appearing in the media, and other 
sources.202 An analogy can be drawn to Rule 104, which states that a court 
is “not bound by evidence rules” in deciding whether evidence is 
admissible.203 Rule 201 helpfully states that judicial notice must be taken if 
 
198 See, e.g., Heist v. Cnty. of Colusa, 213 Cal. Rptr. 278, 285 (Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to take 
judicial notice of information contained in document that contained disclaimer as to factual accuracy).  
199 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, § 2:5 (noting that judicial notice is more 
appropriate where a fact is “stated over and over again in countless sources” and so can be verified 
easily enough by opposing parties). 
200 See, e.g., Vargas v. Keane, 86 F.3d 1273, 1277 (2d Cir. 1996).  
201 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, § 2:3 (party requesting judicial notice has burden 
of proving elements of Rule 201(b)). 
202 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9 § 5108 (“[T]he writers all suppose that Rule 201 and its 
state clones permit the use of inadmissible evidence in determining the propriety of judicial notice,” as 
was the case at common law). 
203 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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“the court is supplied with the necessary information,” anticipating a free 
flow of information to the judge, unconstrained by the rules of evidence.204 
E. The Process of Preserving Internet Sources 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not mandate any set procedure to 
judicially notice a fact.205 However, the fleeting nature of Internet sources 
requires the development of a new process to memorialize the fact and 
source at issue.206 This process both guides judges’ analysis of expertise, 
independence, and motivation, and preserves that analysis and the source 
material for appellate review. 
Assuming a judge chooses to “Google” a source and take judicial 
notice of a fact, the following procedures should be adopted as a matter of 
best practices. Primarily, they involve memorializing formal findings on 
the record. Although not mandatory, such a procedure would ensure a 
measure of accountability at both the trial and appellate stages. 
First, in assessing the expertise of a new source of information, the 
trial court should make formal findings regarding several factors, including 
whether the expertise is based on experience, education, training, 
reputation, or specific research or knowledge in a particular discipline or 
subject area.207 These categories should be quite familiar because trial 
judges must routinely make similar decisions in admitting the testimony of 
expert witnesses.208 In the judicial notice context, however, the judicial task 
is more challenging because the determination is made without the 
adversarial process. There can be no voir dire of experts, no substantial 
exploration of qualifications, credentials, or relevant experience or 
knowledge. Faced with this reality, judges should make as detailed a record 
as possible of why this source is sufficiently expert to be relied upon. These 
findings will provide a concrete starting point for review on appeal. 
Concerning independence, courts should make formal findings about 
why a particular source is independent enough to be judicially noticed. This 
process would be similar to evaluating a witness’s bias and motives to 
fabricate. The evaluation would include assessing possible financial 
 
204 Id. 201(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
205 The only requirements in the Rules involve: (1) how the court should take judicial notice, id. 
201(c); (2) when the court should take judicial notice, id. 201(d); and (3) a provision allowing the 
opposition to be heard, id. 201(e). 
206 See generally Patricia A. Broussard, Now You See It Now You Don’t: Addressing the Issue of 
Websites Which Are “Lost in Space,” 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 155, 156–57 (2009) (discussing the 
concern of scholarship based on websites that no longer exist); Raizel Liebler & June Liebert, 
Something Rotten in the State of Legal Citation: The Life Span of a United States Supreme Court 
Citation Containing an Internet Link (1996–2010), 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 273, 278 (2013) (finding that 
29% of hyperlinks in Supreme Court opinions no longer function). 
207 The findings should also include any other considerations that the trial court relied on in 
reaching the determination to take judicial notice.  
208 See e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
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interests, reputational interests, personal connections, and the like. Such a 
process is quite similar to ordinary credibility findings that judges make 
about witnesses, focusing on the clarity of information, consistency, 
believability, and appearance of honesty.209 Although courts cannot judge 
the “demeanor” of an online source, many of the same considerations are at 
play in evaluating impartiality. These findings should be recorded for 
analytical clarity and the record on appeal. 
Finally, courts should make findings about motivations. As already 
stated, the rules of evidence are full of motivational considerations—
statements against penal interest, present sense impressions, excited 
utterances. All are considered reliable because of the motivations behind 
the statements. Courts are well attuned to the practice of determining 
motivations, and can make accurate findings about these issues. For 
purposes of judicial notice, courts should evaluate the motivations for 
accuracy and memorialize this reasoning in formalized findings. 
In addition to these findings, courts should also preserve a copy of the 
source material or memorialize it in some way. A printout of the source, 
including the time and date of the viewing, should be made part of the 
record. In this way, the source material will be preserved for appeal.210 This 
type of transparency, preservation of the source, and judicial findings 
justifying reliance on the source will produce an accurate and reviewable 
record of judicial notice rulings as the practice evolves with Internet 
sources. 
F. The Sixth Amendment and Judicial Notice in Criminal Cases 
As a concession to the jury’s special constitutional role in criminal 
cases, Rule 201(f) requires a judge in a criminal trial to instruct the jury 
that it “may or may not accept” any judicially noticed fact as conclusive.211 
This preserves the “spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial” in 
criminal cases, and allows defense counsel to contest facts judicially 
noticed at trial.212 The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation raises 
additional concerns when the prosecution requests judicial notice to assist 
 
209 Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983) (“Face to face with living witnesses the 
original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded.” 
(quoting United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952))). 
210 Having a preserved copy is important to this process, be it digital or in paper form, to be 
compared and discussed on appeal.  
211 FED. R. EVID. 201(f) (emphasis added). 
212 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973) (discussing Rule 201(g), which has been subsequently 
renumbered to Rule 201(f)); see also United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 333 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n 
criminal cases, the parties may contest facts judicially noticed . . . .”); COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF 
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (1969), reprinted in 
46 F.R.D. 161, 204–05 (discussing the distinction that in criminal cases the jury is not required to treat 
judicially noticed facts as adjudicative). 
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in proving a criminal case. In such circumstances, the defense may object 
that providing information to the jury authored by a witness who cannot be 
cross-examined violates the defendant’s right to “be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”213 
After Crawford v. Washington, however, any objection to the judicial 
notice of Internet sources seems doomed.214 In Crawford and its progeny, 
the Supreme Court determined that the Confrontation Clause only applies 
to “testimonial” evidence,215 defined as statements “procured with a 
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”216 Although not specifically addressed in the handful of post-
Crawford Confrontation Clause cases, it seems unlikely that this definition 
will apply with any regularity to judicially noticed information from 
Internet sources. In rare circumstances where information appearing on the 
Internet was prepared for purposes of litigation, the Confrontation Clause 
may prohibit its introduction via judicial notice. In the vast majority of 
circumstances, however, Internet material is not created with this primary 
purpose, and so can be a proper subject of judicial notice, even if requested 
by the prosecution in a criminal trial.217 
IV. THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED: FOUR EXAMPLES 
The previous Part sketches a framework that courts can use to assess 
the propriety of taking judicial notice of information found online under 
Rule 201. To illustrate its application, this Part applies the framework to 
examples using common online sources: Google Maps, WebMD, Zillow, 
and a website for a retail company. These examples are intended to 
represent a broad array of online sources so as to maximize their value in 
assessing analogous online sites. 
 
213 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Kuai Li, 280 F. App’x 267, 269 (4th Cir. 
2008) (rejecting the contention that the district court violated the confrontation clause by taking judicial 
notice). 
214 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
215 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419–20 (2007) (clarifying that Confrontation Clause is not 
implicated by nontestimonial statements); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements 
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”). 
216 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible 
Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1867–68 (2012) (describing the “dramatic” 
evolution of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence from Crawford to Bryant). 
217 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 & n.9 (emphasizing Confrontation Clause’s inapplicability to 
statements “not [procured] to create a record for trial” and “not procured with a primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”). As Confrontation Clause scrutiny wanes, the 
Supreme Court has hinted that amorphous “due process” protections may take its place. See id. at 1162 
n.13. There are few signs, however, that these due process protections will have significant teeth. See 
Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 
47–49 (2012) (analyzing the role for due process in protecting defendants from the introduction of 
unreliable, unconfronted hearsay after Crawford). 
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A. Basic Geography Using Google Maps 
Consider a situation in which a prosecutor seeks to prove the distance 
between a defendant selling drugs and an elementary school. Such evidence 
is often critical to establish certain crimes and enhancements.218 The 
prosecutor will presumably have already introduced evidence pinpointing 
the location of the drug sale. At this point, the prosecutor could ask the 
judge to take judicial notice, using Google Maps, to establish that the 
alleged drug deal took place adjacent to a school. 
To determine the propriety of judicial notice, the judge should evaluate 
the source’s reliability by considering the factors sketched out in the 
previous section: (i) knowledge of the subject matter, (ii) independence 
from relevant bias, and (iii) incentive to ensure accuracy. In most instances 
where counsel offers online sources for purposes of judicial notice, the 
proponent will need to make an affirmative showing on these factors.219 
Google Maps may be different. The website is so well known and enjoys 
such broad use that it may have achieved a status akin to Webster’s 
Dictionary, permitting judicial notice of the accuracy of the site itself.220 If 
the judge does not consider Google Maps’ accuracy to be “commonly 
known,” counsel can offer journalistic descriptions of Google Maps’ 
process as well as information provided by the site that can inform the 
reliability assessment.221 Defense counsel must be provided an opportunity 
“to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice.”222 The judge should 
consider any defense objections pertaining to why the proximity of the 
alleged drug deal to the school is not a fact that “can be accurately and 
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned” under Rule 201.223 
Assuming a basic understanding of the workings of Google Maps, a 
judge will likely be convinced that judicial notice of the proximity of the 
alleged drug deal to the elementary school via the website is proper. The 
 
218 E.g., United States v. Robles, 814 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussing federal 
sentencing enhancement for selling drugs near a school and methods of proving the same). For an 
example of a statutory violation that is dependent upon geographical location, see CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 3003.5(b) (West 2011) (“[I]t is unlawful for any person for whom [sex offender] registration is 
required . . . to reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly 
gather.”). Geography is important in many other cases as well, such as providing information about the 
likelihood that a person arrested in one location might have committed a crime at another location. 
219 See supra Part III.D. 
220 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5106.2 (noting that in some circumstances, “the 
accuracy of the source may be judicially noticed as ‘commonly known’”). 
221 See Alexis C. Madrigal, How Google Builds Its Maps—and What It Means for the Future of 
Everything, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Sept. 6, 2012, 3:27 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/09/how-google-builds-its-maps-and-what-it-means-for-the-future-of-everything/261913/ 
(describing process by which Google ensures accuracy of its maps). 
222 FED. R. EVID. 201(e). 
223 Id. 201(b)(2). 
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first factor for consideration is Google Maps’ knowledge of the subject 
matter. Here, it is clear that the authors of the information on Google Maps 
have a comprehensive knowledge of local geography gleaned from official 
maps and first-hand observation.224 In addition, the employees at Google 
Maps are experts in applying a process of mapmaking designed with 
numerous safeguards, including cars that patrol for errors, or what Google 
calls “ground truthing” its maps.225 With respect to the second 
consideration, bias, there is no plausible argument that Google Maps is 
biased in any relevant way in its presentation of geography. As for 
incentive to be accurate, Google Maps has a powerful financial incentive to 
ensure the accuracy of its maps and possesses the resources necessary to 
act on that incentive.226 If Google Maps is consistently inaccurate, people 
will not use the site, and Google will suffer reputational harm and financial 
loss. 
Given this analysis, and in the absence of counterarguments that the 
online map is unreliable in this instance, the court should take judicial 
notice under Rule 201. Because this is a criminal case, the jury will be 
instructed that it “may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive,” 
leaving wiggle room for the defense counsel to argue any flaws in the 
prosecution’s low-effort, although highly convincing, method of proof.227 
As noted supra, a judge in the common law era, familiar with the 
geography of the case, may very well have taken judicial notice of this 
same fact, but without Google Maps.228 Technology, and the tireless efforts 
of Google’s employees, makes the process more sophisticated, more 
accurate, and more transparent 
B. Medical Information from WebMD 
Imagine that the parties in a civil suit are litigating an allegation that 
the plaintiff, suffering from migraine headaches and sensitivity to bright 
lights used in the workplace, was fired in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. Could a court, confronted with a dearth of expert 
testimony on the subject, take judicial notice of the symptoms of migraines 
as described on WebMD, including “sensitivity to light, noise or odors”?229 
 
224 Madrigal, supra note 221. 
225 Id. 
226 Scott DeCarlo, The World’s 25 Most Valuable Companies: Apple Is Now on Top, FORBES (Aug. 
11, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/2011/08/11/the-worlds-25-most-
valuable-companies-apple-is-now-on-top/ (listing Google as the twelfth most valuable company in the 
world). 
227 FED. R. EVID. 201(f). 
228 See supra Part I.B. 
229 Migraines & Headaches Health Center, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/migraines-
headaches/tc/migraine-headaches-symptoms (last visited May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Migraines]. 
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The question, again, comes down to whether the existence of these 
symptoms is a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined from” a 
source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”230 With respect 
to knowledge, medical experts edit WebMD, and the page in question notes 
the name of its reviewer (a medical doctor) and the date of the last 
review.231 The reviewer’s credentials are provided on a separate page on the 
WebMD site.232 With respect to the symptoms of migraines, there is no 
obvious reason to question the site’s impartiality. As to accuracy, WebMD, 
like Google Maps, depends on visitors for income, and the site will lose 
those visitors (and subsequently money from advertising revenue) if its 
information is perceived to be inaccurate.233 An additional factor is that the 
typical symptoms of migraines can be found in any number of sources, 
located on the Internet and elsewhere.234 If these sources do not agree that 
sensitivity to light is a common symptom of the affliction, opposing 
counsel can easily raise that point and derail the judicial notice effort. 
If there are any reasons to question the accuracy of WebMD on this 
point, they are not apparent and will have to be raised by the party 
opposing the request for judicial notice. In the absence of any challenge, 
and given the fairly conventional information at issue, the trial court should 
take judicial notice of the above-described symptoms of migraine 
headaches based on the WebMD source. These symptoms of a migraine 
headache are a proper subject of judicial notice. They are “not subject to 
reasonable dispute” because they can be “accurately and readily determined 
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”235 
C. Property Values on Zillow 
A third example of applying the judicial notice framework concerns 
the value of a house listed on the popular real estate website, Zillow.236 
 
230 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
231 Migraines, supra note 229; see also Art Chimes, Website of the Week—WebMD, VOICE OF AM. 
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-09-12-voa20/405489.html/ (last updated Nov. 1, 2009) 
(stating that “everything is reviewed by experts” and quoting the WebMD Chief Medical Editor that 
“every piece of content on our site actually goes through a doctor’s eyes. A board-certified physician 
will look at the content, make sure it’s up to date, accurate, and doesn’t have anything misleading that 
might be misconstrued by a lay audience”); Editorial Policy, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/about-
webmd-policies/about-editorial-policy (last visited May 15, 2014). 
232 E.g., Biography of Melinda Ratini, DO, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/melinda-ratini (last 
visited May 15, 2014). 
233 Chimes, supra note 231 (“WebMD is an advertiser-supported site.”). 
234 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, § 2:5 (noting that judicial notice is more 
appropriate where a fact is “stated over and over again in countless sources” and so can be verified 
easily enough by opposing parties). 
235 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
236 See generally Aurindom Mukherjee, Zillow Revenue Surges as Users Flock to Property Site, 
REUTERS, Feb 14, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/14/us-zillow-results-
idUSBRE91D10Q20130214 (reporting that Zillow had “45.9 million unique users” in January 2013 and 
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Could a judge rely on Zillow to take judicial notice of a home’s value in a 
dispute about the damages from a failed real estate transaction? Here, the 
answer is no. 
Zillow provides “Zestimates” of a house’s value based on sales of 
nearby houses. Importantly, the Zestimate is not calculated using individual 
home appraisals by Zillow employees, but is “calculated from public and 
user submitted data.”237 Realtors, homeowners, and others submit data to 
the website and to local government agencies, and Zillow collects the data 
and runs it through a secret algorithm to estimate the value of properties.238 
Applying the framework proposed above, Zillow’s Zestimate of the 
house’s value fails to attain the requisite status as a fact “that can be 
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.”239 With respect to the value of an individual 
house, Zillow is no expert. Like Google Maps, Zillow’s expertise lies in a 
process of collating data. But unlike Google Maps, which works “on the 
ground,” Zillow does not itself obtain the data or test it for accuracy. As 
Zillow explains, “[o]ur accuracy depends on the home data we receive.”240 
Consequently, the real author of the information about a particular home’s 
value is not Zillow, but another whose knowledge, biases, and motives are 
unknown. Data underlying a particular Zestimate will include important 
details like square footage and the number of bedrooms that may be 
submitted by homeowners or others with an incentive to inflate. 
These flaws are even more apparent on other crowdsourced sites like 
Wikipedia and UrbanDictionary.241 (To the extent, however, that dictionary 
definitions or slang are not “adjudicative” facts, they fall outside the scope 
of Rule 201 and this Article).242 There is no guarantee that the underlying 
 
“provides online housing value appraisals known as ‘Zestimates’”); ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/ 
(last visited May 15, 2014). 
237 Definition of Zestimate, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/zestimate/ (last visited May 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter Definition of Zestimate]. 
238 Id. 
239 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). 
240 Definition of Zestimate, supra note 237. 
241 A recent New York Times article reported on judicial reliance on an online slang dictionary in 
civil and criminal litigation to define terms that crop up in witness testimony. Leslie Kaufman, For the 
Word on the Street, Courts Call Up an Online Witness, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A1. For an 
example case, see State v. Lumpkins, 348 Wis. 2d 264, at ¶ 2 n.2 (Ct. App. April 2, 2013) (relying on 
Urban Dictionary to define “jack” to mean “steal, or take from an unsuspecting person”). Urban 
Dictionary, like Wikipedia, is a crowdsourced site where anyone can contribute definitions. As the 
website boldly proclaims, “Urban Dictionary is the dictionary you write.” URBAN DICTIONARY, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com (last visited May 15, 2014); see also Web Site Terms of Use, URBAN 
DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/tos.php (last visited May 15, 2014) (“The Company 
does not and cannot review all Content posted to or created by users accessing the Website, and is not 
in any manner responsible for the content of these communications or the activities of these users.”). 
242 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (restricting the Rule’s scope to an “adjudicative fact only, not a legislative 
fact”); see id. 201 Advisory Committee’s Note (discussing adjudicative versus legislative facts and 
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information comes from a knowledgeable source, incentivized to be 
accurate, and free from relevant bias. Given a crowdsourced website, a 
judge will have difficulty assessing the source’s reliability on any particular 
question. 
It is important to stress that this analysis does not depend on an 
assumption that crowdsourced websites are less reliable than other sites. 
Rather, skepticism toward crowdsourced websites is driven by the 
anonymity of the contributors, which almost universally ensures that their 
reliability on any particular point can reasonably be questioned. A judge 
refusing to take judicial notice of a Zestimate or Wikipedia entry would not 
be ruling that the information presented there is necessarily inaccurate. 
Rather, the judge would be unable to assess its reliability for the purposes 
of Rule 201, making judicial notice improper. If the context changes, and 
information is presented to the court establishing the reliability of a 
crowdsourced site on a particular point, the assessment may change. At the 
end of the day, the question is not how the site came by its information, but 
whether the site’s reliability can reasonably be questioned.243 
D. Restaurant Menus and Framing the Noticed Fact 
The last example illustrates another type of online source (a retail 
company website) as well as a concept (framing of the noticed fact) that 
could increase courts’ comfort level in taking judicial notice in the 
Information Age. Imagine that a party seeking to corroborate a witness’s 
testimony asks a court to judicially notice the fact that a fast food 
restaurant’s menu (as indicated on the restaurant’s website) includes a 
particular item. The company that created the website clearly has the 
requisite knowledge of its own menu offerings, and some incentive to be 
accurate on this point, but could arguably be biased in favor of puffing the 
number or type of items offered. The court will likely have little 
information about the historical accuracy of the site, or the effort devoted to 
keeping it up to date. In contrast to the WebMD example discussed supra, 
the restaurant’s offerings are also not something that can be easily verified 
with reference to independent sources. 
Simply reframing the fact to be judicially noticed can assuage doubts 
about the reliability of the source with respect to the menu offerings.244 
Rather than taking judicial notice that the restaurant “sells a [particular 
item],” the judge could judicially notice “the contents of the restaurant’s 
 
other “non-evidence facts”); Margolis, supra note 9, at 209 (suggesting that dictionary definitions fall 
somewhere in a gray area between legislative and adjudicative facts). 
243 FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
244 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, § 2:3 (“Whether the indisputability criterion is 
met or not depends in important ways on the degree of specificity with which the proposition to be 
noticed is stated.”). 
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online menu,” allowing a printout of the menu to be shown to the jury.245 
Doing so would allow the court to comply with Rule 201, which mandates 
in a civil case that the court “instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as 
conclusive,”246 without overstating the judge’s confidence in the fact 
noticed. The jury could take the menu as some evidence that corroborates 
the witness’s testimony, while allowing for the possibility (and argument of 
counsel) that the online menu does not, in fact, accurately reflect the 
restaurant’s actual offerings. This ability to frame the judicially noticed fact 
in a manner that most precisely reflects the judge’s level of confidence in 
its accuracy will make judicial notice of online sources more palatable, and 
permit courts to put pertinent online information before jurors even when 
there is some doubt about the underlying accuracy of the information itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial notice of information contained within Internet sources offers 
an efficient and accurate shortcut to resolve many issues in trial. Courts 
should embrace this new innovation on an old subject. Indeed, many courts 
are already taking judicial notice of Internet sources, and this trend will 
only accelerate over time. Jurors, too, will be increasingly tempted to 
(improperly) access online sources during trial as they do in their everyday 
lives. The real question, then, is not whether to allow online information to 
influence legal outcomes, but how to regulate the inevitable flow of that 
information to fact-finders. 
The framework articulated in this Article provides a flexible approach 
to regulating the flow of Internet material to fact-finders through the tool of 
judicial notice. It does so using traditional evidentiary principles and 
remains tethered to Rule 201 and the Advisory Committee Notes. 
Judicial notice, of course, will never replace the adversarial process, 
nor should it. The phenomenon of “Trial by Google” will merely be a time-
saving mechanism for particular points of fact. Mirroring real life, search 
engines will be tools that assist fact-finders in determining pertinent, 
discrete facts, but will not replace other forms of information gathering and 
analysis. The judicial notice doctrine, encapsulated in Rule 201, already 
reflects the requisite balance between efficiency and fairness. The 
framework proposed here simply applies this preexisting balance to a new, 
now-prevalent source of information that was unimaginable when the Rule 
was enacted. 
 
245 In essence, the court would be taking judicial notice of the fact that the online restaurant menu 
contains the offering. Another way to conceptualize the effect of judicial notice in this context is as the 
court taking judicial notice that the menu is authentic and falls within a hearsay exception, such as a 
business record. Cf. Davis v. Nice, No. 5:12cv1002, 2012 WL 3961236, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 
2012) (“According to the City of Akron Police Department website, defendant Nice is the current 
Akron Chief of Police.”). 
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